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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Lawyers deal in a messy world involving flawed human beings, imperfect 
legal institutions, and the need to make a living.  In recent years, a chorus of 
voices has arisen lamenting the disappearance of the lawyer-statesperson, 
satirizing the hundred million lawyer conversations that transpire every month 
discussing the corrupt state of American justice, warning lawyers and lawyers-
to-be of the low state of legal ethics, and even wailing of the “death” of the 
honorable profession of being a lawyer.1 
 It is the thesis of this Article that it is time for lawyers to return to the 
ancient philosophical pursuit of Plato and Aristotle, and the tradition of the 
other authors of the great books of western civilization who have had an 
ongoing conversation about the nature and dimensions of worldly virtue.  This 
tradition should be pragmatically reexamined, resuscitated and reshaped—as 
some recent writers in the field of virtue ethics have started to do—to meet 
the needs of twenty-first century American lawyers. 
 The structure of the remainder of this Article is as follows.  First, in Part II, 
I revisit, in summary fashion, some classical western writings on virtue and 
vice—from ancient times up to the present.  This discussion will outline what 
philosophers and sages have argued about the nature of virtues, their relations 
among themselves and to non-virtuous states (often called vices), their place in 
our psychology, and their role in bringing about human felicity.2  Second, in 
Part III, I examine some important recent legal scholarship on virtue ethics.3  
Third, in Part IV, I offer a ranking and discussion of what I contend are the 
ten most important virtues that lawyers and law students should pragmatically 
strive to perfect in their professional lives.4  Finally, in Part V, I conclude with 
a few parting thoughts.5 
II.  CLASSICAL TEXTS ON VIRTUE AND VICE 
A.  Overview 
 In the tradition of classical literature, the scope of the terms “virtue” and 
“vice” is co-extensive with morality; or, in other words, with “the broadest 
consideration of good and evil in human life, with what is right and wrong for 
[humans] not only to do, but also to wish or desire, and even to think.”6  Plato, 
in The Republic, classified four virtues as cardinal: courage, temperance, justice 
                                                                                                                           
1. See infra notes 46, 76-79, 221-31 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 6-40 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 41-79 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 80-337.  
5. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text. 
6. Mortimer J. Adler, Virtue and Vice, in 3 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 
975, 975 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
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and practical wisdom (or as it is sometimes referred to, prudence).7  Plato’s 
pupil, Aristotle, in his writings divided all virtues into two major categories: (1) 
moral virtues (excellences of character) and (2) intellectual virtues (excellences 
of the mind).8  Moreover, Aristotle subdivided the latter virtues into two 
further groupings: first, those attributes such as, “understanding, science, [and] 
wisdom” which involve “the possession of speculative insight and theoretic 
knowledge;” second, those talents like “art and prudence” which entail “skill in 
practical thinking or in the application of knowledge to production and action 
respectively.”9  Interestingly, “[b]ecause it is concerned with action, or moral 
conduct, the virtue of prudence is most closely associated with the moral 
virtues of justice, courage, and temperance.”10 
 Augustine and Aquinas were influenced by the New Testament admonition 
of St. Paul in First Corinthians: 
 Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not 
charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. 
 And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and 
all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, 
and have not charity, I am nothing. 
 And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my 
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. 
 Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth 
not itself, is not puffed up, 
 Doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily 
provoked, thinketh no evil; 
 Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; 
                                                                                                                           
7. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans.), reprinted in 7 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 295, 346-56 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).  In The Republic, Plato 
quotes Socrates as comparing the harmony produced by virtue in the soul with the harmony of 
the parts in a healthy human body.  Socrates claims that “good practices lead to virtue, and evil 
practices to vice,” while “virtues of the soul . . . can be implanted by habit and exercise.” Adler, 
supra note 6, at 977. 
8. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W.D. Ross trans.), reprinted in 9 
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 339, 347-94 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) 
(discussing the classification of virtues and correlative vices); ARISTOTLE, PHYSICAL TREATISES: 
PHYSICS (R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye trans.), reprinted in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD 259, 330 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (enumerating and describing the 
intellectual and moral virtues). 
9. Adler, supra note 6, at 975. 
10. Id. 
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 Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all 
things. 
 Charity never faileth: but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; . . .  
whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. 
 For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. 
 But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be 
done away. 
 When I was a child, I spake as a child, . . . but when I became a man, I put 
away childish things. 
 For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know 
in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.  
 And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these 
is charity.
11
 
 In The City of God, Augustine made a critical distinction about virtue: “What 
the Christians believe regarding the supreme good and evil, in opposition to 
the philosophers, who have maintained that the supreme good is in 
themselves.”12  Citing the Apostle Paul’s paen to spiritual charity, Augustine 
contends that, for Christians, virtues of God’s grace are more important than 
humanly-forged virtues.  Augustine observes that “the very virtues of this life, 
which are certainly its best and most useful possessions, are all the more telling 
proofs of its miseries in proportion as they are helpful against the violence of 
its dangers, toils, and woes.”13  Making a distinction between the virtues of the 
world—which Augustine implicitly views as false—and the “true virtues” of 
the spiritual world yet-to-come, he claims: 
For if these are true virtues—and such cannot exist save in those who have true 
piety—they do not profess to be able to deliver the men who possess them 
from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess that by the 
hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved in the many and 
great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe.
14
 
 In Summa Theologica, Aquinas also saw a fundamental difference between 
virtues that humans seek to achieve through their own effort and supernatural 
                                                                                                                           
11. 1 Corinthians 13:1-13 (King James) (alteration in original). 
12. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans.) (1273), reprinted in 18 
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 129, 511 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952)    
(alteration in original).     
13. Id. at 513. 
14. Id.  
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“theological virtues”15 that can be achieved only through God’s grace.  In 
Aquinas’s inimitable language: 
Now man’s happiness is twofold . . . .  One is proportionate to human nature, a 
happiness, namely, which man can obtain by means of the principles of his 
nature.  The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can 
obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead . . 
. . And because such happiness surpasses the proportion of human nature, 
man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity 
do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness.  Hence it is necessary for 
man to receive from God some additional principles, by means of which he may 
be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural 
end by means of his natural principles, although not without the Divine 
assistance.  Such principles are called theological virtues: first, because their 
object is God, because they direct us rightly to God; secondly, because they are 
infused in us by God alone; thirdly, because these virtues are not made known 
to us except by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.
16
 
                                                                                                                           
15. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1273), reprinted in 20 GREAT BOOKS 
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 60 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
16. Id. at 60. Julia Annas—a philosophy professor at the University of Arizona—has 
recently authored a book chapter which elucidates the profound impact that ancient 
philosophers made on virtue ethics.  See Julia Annas, Ancient Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century, 
in THE FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 25 (Brian Leiter ed., 2004).  As Annas points out: 
 
 Ancient ethics begins from reflection on my life as a whole, and my attempts to live 
a good life, rather than one whose form is given by unreflective adherence to norms and 
priorities.  Different ethical theories are seen as giving different answers to the question of 
how I can, in fact, live a good life, and ethics is thus seen as a struggle to come up with 
the right specification of my final end, the goal I am seeking in my life as a whole.  
Because this end is in ancient thought characterized as eudaimonia or happiness, this type 
of ethical theory is rightly called eudaimonist.  Until the last decades, theories of this kind 
had been seen as being of very limited contemporary relevance, mainly because of crude 
and uncriticized conceptions of happiness.  Aristotle’s theory, for example, was frequently 
dismissed as egoistic, the assumption being that happiness is enjoyment or some other 
desirable state of yourself which you are trying to bring about.  Related problems of 
interpretation afflicted understanding of virtue in this kind of theory.  It is clear just from 
looking at Aristotle’s theory, for example, that virtue, the activity of being a certain kind of 
good person, is a complex and multifaceted thing. 
 
Id. at 38-39.  As Professor Annas opines, modern ethical theory, through a renewed 
interest in virtue ethics, has returned to ancient insights: 
 
 And so, study of virtue and happiness over a wide range of theories has had two 
mutually supporting results.  On the one hand, we now have a far better understanding of 
theories like those of Epicurus and the Stoics.  Epicurus had been seen simply as a 
hedonist, and the Stoics as implausibly high-minded about virtue.  Interpreting them in a 
rigorously philosophical way, and seeing their theories as attempts to produce differing 
defensible conceptions of living a good life, has revealed these theories to be far richer 
and more philosophically applicable.  On the other hand, our improved understanding of virtue and 
happiness in the ancient theories has fed into the modern revival of so-called ‘virtue ethics.’  For some 
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B.  The Importance of Habits in the Formation of Virtues 
 The role of habit—the habitual doing or practicing of good deeds—has 
held a central part in classical texts on virtue and vice.  Thus, going back to the 
Old Testament, we are told in Proverbs to “[t]rain up a child in the way he 
should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it,”17 and, by negative 
inference in Jeremiah: “Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his 
spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil.”18  Euripides, 
the ancient Greek playwright, reminds us of the importance of living a life of 
disciplined habit in the cultivation of human virtue in three of his plays: The 
Suppliants,19 Electra,20 and Iphigenia at Aulis.21  Aristotle emphasizes the 
prominence of training and practice in causing good habits to be formed and, 
ultimately, virtuous character to emerge.22  The ancient Roman emperor-
philosopher, Marcus Aurelius, in his The Meditations, reaffirms this theme by 
opining: “Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of 
thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts.”23  Aquinas, in Summa 
Theologica, devotes an extensive portion of his book to habits: the general 
momentousness of habits, how good habits lead to virtuous conduct, and how 
bad habits induce vice.24  Writing in Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes stressed the 
point that virtue means “wit;” this “wit . . . is gotten by use only, and 
experience” and “consisteth principally in two things: celerity of imagining (that is, 
swift succession of one thought to another); and steady direction to some 
approved end.”25  The sixteenth century French essayist, Michel de 
Montaigne, added his thoughts to the ever-growing body of thought on habits 
                                                                                                                           
time virtue has become a prominent concept in ethical theory, but modern assumptions 
have limited the illumination that this can bring.  Exploration of different kinds of ancient 
theory that base themselves on virtue and happiness has opened up the many different 
ways these concepts might figure in a modern ethical theory.   
 
    Id. at 39 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
17. Proverbs 22:6 (King James). 
18. Jeremiah 13:23 (King James). 
19. EURIPIDES, THE SUPPLIANTS (Edward P. Coleridge trans.), reprinted in 5 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 258, 266 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
20. EURIPIDES, ELECTRA (Edward P. Coleridge trans.), reprinted in 5 GREAT BOOKS OF 
THE WESTERN WORLD 327, 330-337 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
21. EURIPIDES, IPHIGENIA AT AULIS (Edward P. Coleridge trans.), reprinted in 5 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 425, 429-30 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
22. See ARISTOTLE, LOGIC: CATEGORIES (E.M. Edghill trans.), reprinted in 8 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 5, 18 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952); ARISTOTLE, 
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 8, at 333, 340, 348-51, 403, 423, 434-35; ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans.), reprinted in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 445, 
537, 539, 542 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
23. MARCUS AURELIUS, THE MEDITATIONS (George Long trans.), reprinted in 12 
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 253, 271 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
24. AQUINAS, supra note 15, at 1-204. 
25. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Nelle Fuller ed.) (1651), reprinted in 23 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 39, 66 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
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as necessary antecedents of virtue.  According to Montaigne, reflecting on the 
courage of Socrates in facing his death sentence from an Athenian jury, 
Socrates’ courage was a result of a “perfect . . . habitude to virtue . . . turned to 
a complexion.”26  This Socratic “habitude to virtue,” as understood by 
Montaigne, was: 
[T]he very essence of [his] soul, its natural and ordinary habit; [he] ha[d] 
rendered it such by a long practise of philosophical precepts having lit upon a 
rich and fine nature; the vicious passions that spring in us can find no entrance 
into [him]; the force and vigor of [his] soul stifle and extinguish irregular desires, 
so soon as they begin to move.
27
 
 The Great Bard, in Hamlet, has the Prince of Denmark speak these 
memorable words to his mother, the queen, on the value of habit in creating 
virtue:  
 O, throw away the worser part of it, And live the purer with the other 
half.  Good night; but go not to mine uncle’s bed.  Assume a virtue, if you have 
it not.  That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat, Of habits devil, is angel 
yet in this, That to the use of actions fair and good He likewise gives a frock or 
livery, That aptly is put on.  Refrain to-night, And that shall lend a kind of 
easiness To the next abstinence; the next more easy; For use almost can change 
the stamp of nature, And either master the devil, or throw him out With 
wondrous potency.
28
 
 Sir Francis Bacon, writing in 1605, agreed with Shakespeare’s view—
expressed in Hamlet—of moral practice, or habit as vital to shape a virtuous 
human being.  As Bacon expressed the role of habit on value formation: 
[T]he most notable and effectual [point] to the reducing of the mind unto virtue 
and good estate . . . is, the electing and propounding unto a [person’s] self good 
and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his 
compass to attain.  For if these two things be supposed, that a [person] set 
before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and 
true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once.  
And this is indeed like the work of nature; whereas the other [step by step 
process] is like the work of the hand.  For as when a carver makes an image, he 
shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the face, that part 
which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such time as he comes to it.  
But contrariwise when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth 
rudiments of all the parts at one time.  So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a 
                                                                                                                           
26. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE ESSAYS II (1588), reprinted in 25 GREAT BOOKS OF 
THE WESTERN WORLD 159, 203 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
27. Id. at 203. 
28. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (William George Clark & William Aldis Wright 
eds.), reprinted in 2 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 29, 56 (Robert Maynard Hutchinson 
ed., 1952) (alteration in original). 
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[person] practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the 
like: but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what 
virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto 
him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto.
29
 
 The seventeenth century polymath, John Locke, starting with his student 
days at Oxford University and continuing in later years with the keeping of 
common-place books, pursued a wide assortment of intellectual projects 
ranging from chemistry to meteorology; from medicine to theology; from 
government to political philosophy.  He frequently held informal meetings 
with friends and acquaintances to discuss various questions.  At one of those 
gatherings a question arose concerning the “limits of human understanding.”  
Thereafter, Locke endeavored to pursue an answer, and what had “begun by 
chance, was continued by [e]ntreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after 
long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as humour and occasions permitted” 
was ultimately published in 1689 as An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.30  
In a chapter entitled “Of Power,” Locke argued that, through discipline and 
the development of good habits, “[w]e can change the agreeableness or 
disagreeableness in things” and, therefore, that it was “in a [person’s] power to 
change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies” day-to-day 
living.31  Alluding to eating habits as an example, Locke provides the following 
charming analysis: 
[People] may and should correct their palates, and give relish to what either has, 
or they suppose has, none.  The relish of the mind is as various as that of the 
body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think that [people] 
cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in actions into pleasure 
and desire, if they will do but what is in their power.  A due consideration will do it 
in some cases; and practice, application, and custom in most.
32
 
 The great eighteenth century philosopher, Immanuel Kant, described a 
“duty of virtue” which consists of “a consciousness . . . of the power to become 
master of one’s inclinations,” such that “human morality in its highest stage 
can yet be nothing more than virtue” which, as he saw it, “is poetically 
personified under the name of the wise man (an ideal to which one should 
continuoually approximate).”33  While Kant acknowledged the role of habit in 
                                                                                                                           
29. FRANCIS BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING (1605), reprinted in 30 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 80 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (alteration in 
original). 
30. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689), reprinted 
in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 85, 87 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
31. Id. at 197 (emphasis omitted in first quote). 
32. Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original). 
33. IMMANUEL KANT, PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTS OF ETHICS (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans.) (1785), reprinted in 42 GREAT BOOKS OF 
THE WESTERN WORLD 365, 368 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
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virtue development, he emphasized the critical importance of mental 
preparation and a resolution to be a virtuous human being, noting in this 
regard: 
 Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as habit, and . . 
. as a long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions.  For, if this is not 
an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and more purified, then, 
like any other mechanical arrangement brought about by technical practical 
reason, it is neither armed for all circumstances nor adequately secured against 
the change that may be wrought by new allurements.
34
 
 In another work, The Critique of Judgment, Kant reiterated his view that 
virtuous behavior is a matter of voluntary choice and human reason and yet—
like consulting the thoughts of admirable thinkers of the past—something that 
can be aided by trying to follow general precepts of virtuous predecessors.  
Kant pontificates on this idea in the following fascinating prose:  
 The fact that we recommend the works of the ancients as models . . . and 
call their authors classical, as constituting a sort of nobility among writers that 
leads the way and thereby gives laws to the people, seems to indicate a posteriori 
sources of taste . . . in each individual.  But we might just as well say that the 
ancient mathematicians, who, to this day, are looked upon as the almost 
indispensable models of perfect thoroughness and elegance in synthetic 
methods, prove that reason also is on our part only imitative . . . .  There is no 
employment of our powers, no matter how free . . . which, if each individual 
had always to start afresh with the crude equipment of his natural state, would 
not get itself involved in blundering attempts, did not those of others lie before 
it as a warning.  Not that predecessors make those who follow in their steps 
mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking in 
themselves for the principles, and so of adopting their own, often better, course.  
Even in religion—where undoubtedly every one has to derive his rule of 
conduct from himself, seeing that he himself remains responsible for it and, 
when he goes wrong, cannot shift the blame upon others as teachers or 
leaders—general precepts learned at the feet either of priests or philosophers, or 
even drawn from ones’ own resources, are never so efficacious as an example of 
virtue or holiness, which . . . does not dispense with the autonomy of virtue 
                                                                                                                           
34. Id. at 368.  Remarkably, Kant provides an equation for virtue and vice: “To virtue 
= + a is opposed as its logical contradictory . . . the negative lack of virtue (moral weakness) = o; but 
vice = - a is its contrary” while “it is not merely a needless question but an offensive one to ask 
whether great crimes do not . . . demand more strength of mind than great virtues.”  Id. This is 
so, according to Kant, because “by strength of mind we understand the strength of purpose of a 
man, as being endowed with freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his 
senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind.”  Id. at 368-69. 
Later in this book, Kant sets forth a chart describing the following schemata:  “The 
Material Element of the Duty of Virtue,” “The Formal Element of the Duty of Virtue,” 
“Internal Duty of Virtue,” and “External Duty of Virtue”—synthesizing matters of morality, 
self actualization and legality.  Id. at 374. 
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drawn from the spontaneous and original idea of morality (a priori), or convert 
this into a mechanical process of imitation.35 
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, writing in 1821 in the last major work 
published during his lifetime, The Philosophy of Right, linked education with 
habit and, ultimately, with being able to live an ethical life.  In this regard, 
Hegel observed:  
Education is the art of making [people] ethical.  It begins with pupils whose life 
is at the instinctive level and shows them the way to a second birth, the way to 
change their instinctive nature into a second, intellectual, nature, and makes this 
intellectual level habitual to them.  At this point the clash between the natural 
and the subjective will disappears, the subject’s internal struggle dies away.  To 
this extent, habit is part of the ethical life as it is of philosophic thought also, 
since such thought demands that mind be trained against capricious fancies, and 
that these be destroyed and overcome to leave the way clear for rational 
thinking.
36
 
 The monumental Russian author, Leo Tolstoy, conveys the value of 
ordered, habitual activity to the development of virtue through his gruff 
character, Prince Bolkónski, in the 1869 opus War and Peace.  As Tolstoy 
described the prince: “He used to say that there are only two sources of 
human vice—idleness and superstition, and only two virtues—activity and 
intelligence.”37  Later in the same novel, Tolstoy portrays a military officer, 
Rostóv, as having developed the virtue of courage under fire through dint of 
habit.  Rostóv “was fearless, not because he had grown used to being under 
fire (one cannot grow used to danger), but because he had learned how to 
manage his thoughts when in danger.”38 
 Expressing his thoughts on the importance of habit formation in the then 
new language of psychology, William James, writing in 1890 argued: 
 The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally 
instead of our enemy.  It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease 
upon the interest of the fund.  For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early 
as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against the growing into ways 
that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the 
plague.  The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the 
                                                                                                                           
35. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (James Creed Meredith trans.) 
(1790), reprinted in 42 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 461, 513-14 (Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ed., 1952). 
36. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M Knox 
trans.) (1821), reprinted in 46 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 132 (Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ed., 1952) (alteration in original). 
37. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE (Louise Maude & Aylmer Maude trans.) (1869), 
reprinted in 51 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD I, at 47 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 
1952). 
38. Id. at 369. 
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effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be 
set free for their own proper work.
39
 
 James goes so far, in his discussion of the importance of cultivating good 
habits, as to claim that habitual good cheer can lead to a happy and kind 
disposition.40 
III.  RECENT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON VIRTUE ETHICS 
A.  Background 
 As discussed in Part II, classical virtuous thinkers talked about abstract and 
universal human qualities important to living a good life.41  Philosophers 
during recent decades, however, have tried to reconceptualize virtue ethics by 
emphasizing the “cultivat[ion] [of] virtues in concrete human individuals” and 
in concrete human situations.42  This modern turn to concrete virtue ethics, 
                                                                                                                           
39. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890), reprinted in 53 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD xiii, at 80 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
40. Id. at 751-52. 
41. See supra notes 6-40 and accompanying text. 
42. THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 763 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. 
Tsui-James eds., 1996).  According to one chapter authored in this book, virtue theory is not a 
favored type of ethical theory for analytic philosophers: 
 
   Moral theories are standardly presented as falling into three basic types, 
centring respectively on consequences, rights and virtues.  The first are 
unsurprisingly called ‘consequentialist,’ and the last ‘virtue theories.’  The 
second are often called ‘deontological,’ which means that they are centred 
on duty or obligation . . . .     
 
 Another way of understanding the division into three is in terms of what each 
theory sees as most basically bearing ethical value.  For the first type of theory, it is good 
states of affairs, and right action is understood as action tending to bring about good states 
of affairs.  For the second type, it is right action; sometimes what makes an action right is a 
fact about its consequences, but often it is not—its rightness is determined rather by 
respect for others’ rights, or by other obligations that the agent may have.  Virtue theory, 
finally, puts most emphasis on the idea of a good person, someone who could be described 
also as an ethically admirable person.  This is an important emphasis, and the notion of a 
virtue is important in ethics.  However, once the types of theory are distinguished in this 
way, it is hard to see them as all in the same line of business.  Consequentialist and rights 
theories aim to systematize our principles or rules of action in ways that will, supposedly, 
help us to see what to do or recommend in particular cases.  A theory of the virtues can 
hardly do that: the theory itself, after all, is going to say that what you basically need in 
order to do and recommend the right things are virtues, not a theory about virtues.  
Moreover, virtuous people do not think always, or usually, about the virtues.  They think 
about such things as good consequences or people’s rights, and this makes it clear that 
‘virtue theory’ cannot be on the same level as the other two types of theory. 
 
Bernard Williams, Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 33-34. 
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therefore, departs, somewhat, from philosophers like Leslie Stevenson, for 
example, who writes in his popular book, Ten Theories of Human Nature, about 
human virtue in a more traditional, abstract, and universalized style.43 
 Notable work by philosophers in the modern virtue ethics tradition include 
books by Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Gabriele 
Taylor and Bernard Williams.44   
B.  Recent Legal Scholarship 
 During the 1980s and 1990s a handful of legal scholars interested in legal 
ethics wrote about the personhood of lawyers and specific risks to lawyers’ 
character and moral development by the decisions they made (or failed to 
                                                                                                                           
43. LESLIE STEVENSON & DAVID L. HABERMAN, TEN THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE 
(3d ed. 1998).  Thus, this book discusses, by way of illustration, Confucianism (premised on the 
belief that “all human beings have the capacity to cultivate virtue and bring themselves into 
harmony with the Decree of Heaven”), id. at 28; the Judeo-Christian tradition (which “puts the 
emphasis on human goodness, and this is something that is open to all, and independent of 
intellectual power”), id. at 76; Platonism (which holds that in spite of “the messy reality of human 
beings in actual situations” there, nevertheless, “are absolute standards of value set for us by the 
ethical Forms”), id. at 94-95; and Sartre’s existential theory of radical freedom (arguing that “[w]e must 
accept our responsibility for everything about ourselves—not just our actions, but our attitudes, 
our emotions, our dispositions, and our characters”), id. at 182. 
44. See generally PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY (1978); ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 
(1981); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK 
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (1986); GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS 
OF SELF-ASSESSMENT (1985); and BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 
1973-1980 (1981).  University of Michigan philosophy professor, Peter Railton, traced the 
neglect of virtue ethics during most of the twentieth century and a renaissance of renewed 
interest in recent years in a book chapter.  See Peter Railton, Toward an Ethics That Inhabits the 
World, in THE FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 265 (Brian Leiter ed., 2004).  According to Railton: 
 
 Dissatisfaction with the limited conception of moral action available to duty-based 
approaches to moral practice, and with the relative impoverishment of prevalent 
philosophical treatments of the role of emotion and motivation in a moral thought, 
helped stimulate a revival of interest in virtue theories toward the end of the twentieth 
century.  Virtue theory had been influential in moral philosophy from ancient times 
into the early modern period, but it nonetheless suffered neglect in the twentieth 
century, partly because of incompletely-formulated doubts about whether such theories 
could really “add” anything to a proper account of moral obligation.  It was felt that 
moral virtue either was a matter of possessing “non-cognitive” motivations or feelings not 
under conscientious voluntary control—“being brave”, say—,and therefore outside the 
scope of a properly moral “ought”, or it was a matter of striving conscientiously toward 
developing such valuable motivations or feelings or acting in accord with them—
“trying to be brave” or “trying to act bravely”, say—, in which case a theory of 
obligation could already incorporate it. 
 
    Id. at 271. 
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make),45 by the ideals they cultivated (or failed to cultivate),46 and by the moral 
responsibility they exercised (or neglected to exercise).47 
 A symposium, published in 2002 by the Notre Dame Law Review in honor of 
the writings of Professor Thomas Shaffer, did a particularly commendable job 
of elucidating the virtue ethics theory and the law.48  Two articles published as 
part of this symposium are quite worthwhile.  The first article, by Professor 
Marie A. Failinger, encapsulates the function of virtue ethics as “center[ing] on 
the organic formation of dispositions or traits of character in response to 
situations arising in a concrete community from which the description of 
those virtues arises.”49  Failinger makes the penetrating observation that 
literary conceptions of worthy and essential virtues for an individual to 
acquire, cultivate and perfect—from Homer to Jane Austen—have always 
been linked with what she calls “fittedness:” such “that the virtues allow one 
to take one’s place in some naturally well-organized community,”50 whether it 
be a bricklayer in ancient Athens51 or a “well-bred young woman” in Victorian 
England.52  Grafting fittedness onto the virtuous responsibilities of the 
modern American lawyer, Failinger describes Shaffer’s work as consistent with 
this tradition.  As she explains: 
 Consistently with situational virtue theories, Tom Shaffer’s narrative 
work, which locates the good lawyer in a particular place and time, relationship 
and role, similarly suggests an organic understanding of obligation.  Shaffer 
takes great pains to reiterate, time and again, that even the most stalwart and 
independent of Shaffer’s narrative heroes, Atticus Finch, derives his identity not 
from any choice or self-construction but from the town of Maycomb where he 
has grown up, lived, and worked: he cannot be what he is other than out of 
interaction with those with whom he has lived.  As a character in community, a 
                                                                                                                           
45. See, e.g., RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989). 
46. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
47. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994). 
48. Symposium, Propter Honoris Respectum, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 705 (2002). 
49. Marie A. Failinger, Is Tom Shaffer a Covenantal Lawyer?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
705, 720 (2002). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 720: 
 
In its Homeric form, virtue ethics posited almost a perfect correspondence between 
individual character and community cohesion, focusing on the development of those 
habits which would fit one for the social position in which one found oneself by virtue of 
birth, so that a bricklayer’s sons would be expected to develop different virtues than a 
patrician’s child. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
52. Id. at 721 (discussing Jane Austen’s description of the virtues of the well-bred 
young woman) (footnote omitted). 
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good lawyer or professional comes from a family, comes from a church, and has 
a town.  He would not be who he is if it were not for his sturdy … ancestors 
and the other people of background from whom he came.
53
 
 Professor Failinger goes on to reflect on Shaffer’s argument against the 
lawyer “becoming a godfather, guru, or hired gun, either putting the client at 
her mercy or being at the mercy of the client.”54  Failinger observes that virtue 
ethics must be modified by an appreciation that a covenantal relationship 
“protects the client’s moral freedom from the lawyer as guru”55 and “gives the 
client not only the right but also the responsibility to make moral choices that 
arise in representational situations.”56  Failinger, it seems, argues that a lawyer 
who obsesses with unmodified virtue ethics is, unpragmatically, making 
perfect the enemy of the good.  As she writes: 
Virtue ethics, at least as it has been incorporated into legal ethics, continues to 
hold onto the security of the present while moving toward the future: it points 
the way toward what is desirable but not existing, which is not now but could 
be.  In a sense, the virtue ethicist is shielded from acknowledging his present 
failures because he can distinguish between what he is now and what he could 
be: perfect virtue is an aspiration, something to work for, but so long as a 
person is on the path toward virtue, he is to be admired for his effort rather 
than castigated for his failure.
57
 
 The second article in the aforementioned Notre Dame Law Review 
symposium is by Professor Reed Elizabeth Loder.58  Loder’s article, firmly 
ensconced in the field of virtue ethics, insists on “consider[ing] lawyers’ moral 
character more closely.”59  Indeed, “[t]he character trait of integrity as a moral 
and legal resource”60 is the focus of her essay.  In Loder’s view, “[i]ntegrity is a 
key component of moral personality,” with “moral development” and 
“knowledge” inextricably intertwined.61  She sees vital connections between 
“moral integrity” and “intellectual integrity” and “virtuous habits of 
thought.”62  Moreover, she contends that lawyers “face some extra demands” 
of integrity: lawyers must move beyond mere “reflection” on what is virtuous, 
what is good, and what is appropriate;63 for them, “legal integrity involves 
                                                                                                                           
53. Id. at 721-22 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
54. Id. at 729. 
55. Failinger, supra note 49, at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote 
omitted). 
56. Id. at 730. 
57. Id. at 751. 
58. Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 
(2002). 
59. Id. at 842. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 843. 
62. Id. (footnote omitted). 
63. Id.  
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relentless scrutiny of ends and means;”64 for them, “the most insidious 
problem [to avoid] is ethical bareness, which [she] call[s] ‘ethical winter.’”65  
Professor Loder points out that among the “[v]aried [m]eanings of [i]ntegrity 
in [e]veryday [l]ife”66 for lawyers are the following: “wholeness;”67 “the 
ecology of values, beliefs, judgments, and traits that compose a person’s 
unique ethical character;”68 “[w]ithstanding or overcoming odds;”69 
“[e]xhibiting strength;”70 “the fortitude to resist ethical invasions;”71 and 
“follow[ing] an impractical and difficult path rather than degrad[ing] [one’s] 
moral personality.”72   
 Loder makes some useful observations about “[v]irtues and [v]ices 
[s]upporting [i]ntegrity.”73  In general, “[v]irtues dispose a person to act well 
and develop her character in fruitful ways,” while “[s]pecific vices, on the 
other hand, are characteristics that make a person prone to ethical 
deficiencies” that “tend to diminish integrity.”74  Key supporting virtues for 
the meta-virtue of integrity, according to Loder, are courage, constancy, 
humility, adaptability, honesty, authenticity, and candor, with their opposite 
characteristics constituting vices.75  Loder cuts to the heart of the twenty-first 
century malaise affecting many American lawyers when she describes life in 
modern law firms as “barren places” to exercise virtuous lawyerly behavior.76  
She writes: 
Many modern firms discourage unethical behavior to avoid disciplinary actions, 
legal sanctions, and loss of reputation.  Yet, misbehavior is less a problem in 
many firms than the problem of ethical winter.  This is a kind of hibernation of 
the soul.  In the throes of winter, a person is estranged from the affective 
apparatus that spurs moral reflection.  She loses the moral motivation to reflect 
even though she retains the necessary cognitive powers.  Her moral imagination 
shrivels because she is drained of an erotic passion to test morally difficult 
situations by glimpsing the world of others, particularly those affected by her 
acts.  Her empathy atrophies.  She avoids confronting moral ambiguity . . . . 
even as she wallows in its legal counterparts.  Moral anguish no longer 
accompanies complex decisions, although the residue of suppressed distress 
may fill her amorphous disaffection and even self-contempt. 
                                                                                                                           
64. Loder, supra note 58, at 843-44. 
65. Id. at 844. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 845. 
69. Id. 
70. Loder, supra note 58, at 845. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 846. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 846-48. 
76. Loder, supra note 58, at 875. 
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 In a world of law firm accouterments and comforts, where time is scarce, 
and the young and the bright are enticed, one may wonder whether the very 
capacity for moral wisdom evaporates.  Those who inhabit this world may never 
do wicked things, and they may even contribute to societal good, in pro bono 
work for example.  But even good works have their price if they invite ethical 
complacency.  Authentic ethical reflection must arise from an ever-searching 
heart.  The longing for personal betterment fades without tending.
77
 
 The danger of a lawyer inhabiting “ethical winter” is that the lawyer “can 
fall prey to a kind of self-loathing.78  Loder claims, in this regard, that “[w]hat 
was at first professional inauthenticity slips into a newly authentic, lesser self.  
Self-loathing emerges because squelching the moral self leaves lingering guilt 
and regret.”79 
IV.  TEN PRAGMATIC LAWYERLY VIRTUES 
A.  What are Pragmatic Virtues? 
 My chief inspiration for the conception of pragmatic lawyerly virtues is the 
wonderful account tendered by Richard A. Posner in describing the western 
origins of the “pragmatic mood” in the character traits of the protagonist, 
Odysseus, in the ancient Greek poem The Odyssey.80  I think the pragmatically 
virtuous modern lawyer would possess, and seek to continually perfect, the 
coping skills of Odysseus.  In Posner’s inimitable sketch:81 
[The Odyssey] opens with Odysseus living on a remote island ruled by a nymph 
who offers him immortality if he will remain as her consort.  A bit surprisingly 
to anyone steeped in the orthodox Western religio-philosophical-scientific 
tradition, he refuses, preferring mortality and a dangerous struggle to retain his 
position as the king of a small, rocky island and be reunited with his son, aging 
wife, and old father.  He turns down what the orthodox tradition says we should 
desire above all else, the peace that comes from overcoming the transience and 
vicissitudes of mortality . . . .  Odysseus prefers going to arriving, struggle to 
rest, exploring to achieving—curiosity is one of his most marked traits—and 
risk to certainty. . . .  
                                                                                                                           
77. Id. at 875-76 (footnotes omitted). 
78. Id. at 876. 
79. Id.  
80. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 26-28 (2003). 
81. Posner is not only a gifted writer of scholarly books about the law, but also an 
artful composer of stylish judicial opinions.  See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Judge Posner’s Dissenting 
Judicial Oeuvre and the Aesthetics of Canonicity, 36 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2006); Robert F. Blomquist, 
Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward 
an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73 (2004); Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on 
Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate Opinions, 1981-82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion 
Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2000). 
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 Another thing that is odd about the protagonist, and the implicit values, 
of the Odyssey from the orthodox standpoint is that Odysseus is not a conventional 
hero, the kind depicted in the Iliad.  He is strong, brave, and skillful in fighting, 
but he is no Achilles . . . or even Ajax; and he relies on guile, trickery, and 
outright deception to a degree inconsistent with what we have come to think of 
as heroism or with its depiction in the Iliad.  His dominant trait is skill in coping with 
his environment rather than ability to impose himself upon it by brute force.  He is the most 
intelligent person in the Odyssey but his intelligence is thoroughly practical, adaptive.  
Unlike Achilles in the Iliad, who is given to reflection, notably about the heroic 
ethic itself, Odysseus is pragmatic.  He is an instrumental reasoner rather than a 
speculative one.
82
 
 Professor James Boyd White—the Hart Wright Professor of Law and 
Professor of English at the University of Michigan—shares Richard Posner’s 
enthusiastic embrace of the coping skills of Odysseus and the relevance of these 
skills to the life of a lawyer.  White, however, interprets the Odyssean skill in 
grappling with and coming to terms with the challenges of his journey in 
slightly different pragmatic terms—what White explains as “ways of 
imagining himself and [his] world, ways that will make possible coherent 
thought and action on the new conditions in which he finds himself, and to a 
large degree he succeeds in fashioning them.”83  Interestingly, Professor 
White adds two quintessential American pragmatists84 to his pantheon of 
masters of coping, Henry David Thoreau and Huckleberry Finn.  White 
explains the linkage between these pragmatically virtuous characters: 
When Thoreau withdraws from Concord to Walden to spend two years living in 
a hut in the woods, what is he seeking?  Not money, not fame in the usual sense, 
but a different kind of existence, more fully attuned to the natural world and to 
his own imaginative capacities.  He has found the ways of thinking of the world 
and himself that are offered by what he calls “Concord” to be inadequate, dead, 
in a deep way intolerable; and he sets himself the task of fashioning another.  
Walden will be his world elsewhere.  Or consider Huckleberry Finn, telling us 
the story of his life as a marginal figure, living half in the woods with Pap, half in 
town with the Widow, none of it making sense to him.  When he escapes to the 
life on the raft with Jim, he finds an existence full of value and significance, for a 
crucial part of which—his friendship with Jim—he has almost no explicit 
language and with which the language he does have, of slavery and race, is 
totally incompatible.  As Huck lives this life and tells us about it he desperately 
seeks to understand his natural and social worlds—to make sense of them and 
to define himself in relation to them—in a way that will reflect his own 
                                                                                                                           
82. POSNER, supra note 80, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
83. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING 9 (2001). 
84. Cf. ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
THEORY (1982). 
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experience: the experience of his own mind and feelings, his experience of Jim.  
In this he never succeeds.  Or take Odysseus . . . .
85
 
 For Posner and White, then, pragmatists search, trying to find meaning in 
their lives (through language and through ineffable insight), and sometimes 
succeed and sometimes fail.  But, they keep trying on the road to 
enlightenment. As Karen Armstrong explains, Siddhartha Gotama—the 
Buddha—kept trying to find practical, skillful ways to engage the world.86  
According to Armstrong: 
The Buddha had no time for doctrines or creeds; he had no theology to impart, 
no theory about the root cause of [suffering], no tales of an Original Sin, and no 
definition of the Ultimate Reality.  He saw no point in such speculations.  
Buddhism is disconcerting to those who equate faith with belief in certain 
inspired religious opinions.  A person’s theology was a matter of total 
indifference to the Buddha.  To accept a doctrine on somebody else’s authority 
was, in his eyes, an “unskillful” state, which could not lead to enlightenment, 
because it was an abdication of personal responsibility.  He saw no virtue in 
submitting to an official creed.  “Faith” meant trust that [Nirvana] existed and a 
determination to prove it to oneself.  The Buddha always insisted that his 
disciples test everything he taught them against their own experience and take 
nothing on hearsay.  A religious idea could all too easily become a mental idol, 
one more thing to cling to, when the purpose of the [truth] was to help people 
to let go.
87
 
 A final insight on what I am trying to sketch as the pragmatic mood of the 
virtuous American lawyer comes from a book on the ancient Sumerians by 
Samuel Kramer.88  According to Professor Kramer, the ancient Sumerians 
were remarkable for “their ideas, ideals, and values.”89  They were “[c]lear-
sighted, levelheaded, [and] took a pragmatic view of life and, within the limits 
of their intellectual resources, rarely confused fact with fancy, wish with 
fulfillment, or mystery with mystification.”90  Indeed, the pragmatically 
virtuous lawyer that I have in mind would approach her role in a clear-sighted 
and levelheaded fashion—striving to do good, but well aware of the rough 
and tumble demands of the legal profession. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
85. WHITE, supra note 83, at 8-9. 
86. KAREN ARMSTRONG, BUDDHA (2001). 
87. Id. at 100-01. 
88. SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, THE SUMERIANS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE, AND 
CHARACTER (1963). 
89. Id. at 4. 
90. Id. 
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B.  Ten Virtues: A Ranking and Discussion 
 With the pragmatic mood in mind,91 how might we articulate the top 
lawyerly virtues and how would these virtues be ranked?  My impetus for this 
challenging undertaking is a book, by Michael H. Hart, that ranked and 
discussed the 100 “[m]ost [i]nfluential [p]ersons [i]n [h]istory.”92  Yet, my 
purpose in writing about the top ten lawyerly virtues goes beyond mere parlor 
games or intellectual sport.  First, I hope to stir up interest in the legal 
profession concerning virtuous traits for lawyers.  Second, I seek to motivate 
law students and lawyers to reflect on how they can improve their lives as 
attorneys and provide greater value to their clients.  Third, I aspire to improve 
the pursuit of justice, consistent with American ideals, by encouraging the 
nearly one million American lawyers to think about how individual lawyerly 
virtues can add to (or take away from) our highest principles as a nation.93 
 As I explain in the remainder of this Article my list of the top ten 
pragmatic virtues for American lawyers is as follows: 
 
1. Balance 
2. Integrity 
3. Idealism 
4. Compassion 
5. Courage 
6. Creativity 
7. Energy 
8. Justice 
9. Discipline 
10. Perseverance94 
 
 The discussion is tentative and a work-in-progress; it is a précis for a book 
length treatment of the subject that I am in the process of writing. 
1.  Balance 
 Balance connotes harmony and proportionality.  This harmony involves 
giving each demand in our lives its appropriate due.  It also encompasses 
counteracting or neutralizing the weight or importance that you have been 
giving to something in the past (measured in time, money, effort, attention, 
                                                                                                                           
91. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. 
92. MICHAEL H. HART, THE 100: A RANKING OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL PERSONS IN 
HISTORY (1978). 
93. For a powerful discussion of the importance of American principles as part of 
American statecraft, see GARY HART, THE FOURTH POWER: A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 
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94. See infra notes 95-336 and accompanying text. 
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and concern) with the realization that you need to devote more resources to 
something else.  This “something else” might be an existing claim or a brand 
new claim. 
 Psychological and spiritual teachings increasingly suggest that a healthy 
individual is one who is able to balance his or her personal life (health, lover, 
children, family, friends) with his or her professional life (money, competence, 
achievement, colleagues, advancement) and with something less concrete than 
these concerns: spiritual life.  Spirituality might involve one’s religious faith—
attending weekly services involving meaningful rituals; meditations and 
prayers that resonate with our heritage or supernatural beliefs.  Spirituality 
might also, or alternatively, focus on contemplation—soaking up the sights 
and sounds and fragrances of nature, reading philosophically edifying books, 
or the giving of yourself to a morally rewarding activity (like serving donated 
food to the poor or advancing the rights of the unpopular). 
 Being balanced is not quite the same thing as being organized.  Being 
organized is a good place to start, however, because it is a bit easier to think 
about.  Turning to the matter of law school and the importance of organizing 
an exam answer, consider what Professors Helene and Marshall Shapo have 
to say.  They contend: 
[T]he reader of an exam will appreciate it if she discerns a logical framework for 
your answer.  That does not mean that the professor will not dig out the analysis 
if it is there.  It does mean that between two answers that arrive at the same 
analytical conclusion, the one that shows its process of reasoning more clearly 
will receive the better grade.  If that somehow seems unjust to you, ask yourself 
a couple of questions.  Don’t you think judges would value a logical progression 
of argument in briefs?  Don’t you think that clients would value organization in 
their lawyers’ memoranda?
95
 
 So being organized as a law student, as a practicing lawyer, as a judge—as a 
human being—is something that other people in the world whom we value 
think is important.  Why is this so?  Two answers suggest themselves.  First, 
being organized helps other people understand us better.  Language being an 
imperfect means of communication, when someone is disorganized in the 
way he talks or writes, other people must try to interpret exactly what he 
means, precisely where he is coming from.  This creates excessive uncertainty.  
Second, disorganization tends to make people ill at ease.  Whether the 
disorganization is in the clutter of a room, in the chaos of a letter, or in the 
disjointedness of spoken words, a lack of order will usually make others 
uncomfortable because, from an aesthetic standpoint, humans appreciate 
symmetry and structure. 
 Balance, though, is a quality that goes beyond being organized.  It is poise.  
It is self control of one’s emotions, one’s work, one’s time, and one’s 
                                                                                                                           
95. HELENE SHAPO & MARSHALL SHAPO, LAW SCHOOL WITHOUT FEAR: STRATEGIES 
FOR SUCCESS 177 (2d ed. 2002). 
2009] The Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer? 113  
 
thoughts.  It is imperturbability and unruffledness that conveys a fundamental 
attitude that Rudyard Kipling alluded to in his famous poem, “If:” keeping 
your head when all around you others are losing theirs.96  It is a frame of 
mind that communicates in a non-verbal way: “I know that I know;” “I care 
about you enough to tidy up a bit;” “I am glad that I have this opportunity to 
create some harmony in both of our lives.” 
                                                                                                                           
96. See RUDYARD KIPLING, If, in GREAT ENGLISH POETS: RUDYARD KIPLING 49 
(Geoffrey Moore ed., 1992).  Kipling’s poem is a mediation (albeit somewhat dated and sexist) 
on the deep meaning of the virtue of balance: 
 
 If you can keep your head when all about you  
     Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,  
  If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,  
     But make allowance for their doubting too; 
  If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,  
     Or being lied about, don’t deal in lies, 
  Or being hated, don’t give way to hating,  
      And yet don’t look too good, nor talk too wise: 
 
 If you can dream—and not make dreams your  
       master;  
      If you can think—and not make thoughts your  
            aim; 
      If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster  
      And treat those two imposters just the same; 
  If you can bear to hear the truth you’ve spoken  
      Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,  
  Or watch things you gave your life to, broken,   
       And stoop and build ‘em up with worn-out tools: 
 
 If you can make one heap of all your winnings 
      And risk it on one turn of the pitch-and-toss, 
  And lose, and start again at your beginnings 
      And never breathe a word about your loss; 
 
  If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew 
     To serve your turn long after they are gone, 
  And so hold on when there is nothing in you 
     Except the Will which says to them: ‘Hold on!’ 
 
  If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue, 
      Or walk with Kings — nor lose the common touch,  
  If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you, 
     If all men count with you, but none too much; 
  If you can fill the unforgiving minute 
     With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run, 
  Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it, 
      And — which is more — you’ll be a Man, my  
   son! 
 
 Id. at 49-51.  Apologies to twenty-first century women; hopefully one can imagine a 
modern version talking about being a “woman, my daughter!” 
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 Without balance there can be little accomplishment. 
2.  Integrity 
 Integrity has a twofold definition today.  First, integrity means to be 
upright—to exhibit decency, honor, principle, morality, and goodness.  A 
secondary meaning of integrity, however, relates to wholeness.  Integrity, in this 
sense, is defined as totality, completeness, unity, oneness, togetherness, 
coherence, consistency and validity. 
 In being upright, a lawyer or law student exhibits wholeness.  Without an 
unwavering commitment to being good, decent, and honest, legal 
professionals become fractured and two-faced.  They gain notoriety, in such 
circumstances, for manipulation and dissembling. 
 To begin to appreciate the importance of integrity to the ultimate success 
of a law student or a lawyer, a brief explanation of Aristotle’s Theory of Rhetoric 
may be instructive.97  According to Aristotle, the persuasiveness of any speech 
is dependent on a combination of three essential elements that must be 
blended into a single whole: logos, ethos and pathos.  Logos encompasses the 
logical force of an argument—the facts and figures; the inferences and 
deductions to be drawn from the evidence.  Ethos is fashioned by the 
reputation of the advocate—his or her renown for good deeds, truth-telling, 
and honest dealing.  Pathos involves the emotional force of the argument—the 
human drama of conflict and tragedy; of suffering and striving.  To Aristotle’s 
way of looking at advocacy, the success or failure of a pleader of causes 
depends on the unity of logic, reputation, and emotion leading to an 
unshakable conviction that the champion of an argument is a person of 
upright character.  
 Aristotle’s illuminating theory of persuasion through integrity—rightly 
understood as the gravitas or substance that occurs when the sum of logic, 
emotion and reputation turns out to be greater than the sum of the parts—
applies to everything a lawyer does: to the advice given a wealthy client on 
drawing up an estate plan that will be equitable and just; to a demand letter 
written on behalf of an injured person to a corporation allegedly liable for the 
client’s losses; to an address directed at a local planning board, seeking a 
variance from a zoning code for a developer. 
 The importance of integrity to a lawyer or law student’s ultimate success in 
the legal profession can be further understood by plumbing the essential 
details of the way Abraham Lincoln studied and practiced law while leading 
the life of an upstanding citizen.  In this regard, I strongly urge all lawyers and 
lawyers-to-be to read and study Professor William Lee Miller’s masterful 
book, Lincoln’s Virtues.98  Moving to Springfield, Illinois as a young, 
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uneducated man, Lincoln borrowed Blackstone’s Commentaries from his lawyer-
friend, John T. Stuart, and studied these tomes.  Lincoln had the integrity to 
take whatever case came into the three partnerships that he served in during 
his twenty-four year career as a practicing lawyer—throwing the whole weight 
of his intelligence, wit, and ingenuity into the matter.99  During his long career 
as a trial lawyer he argued cases “about ‘malicious mischief’ and fraud and 
‘ejectment’ and foreclosure and murder and bastardy and divorce and slander 
and adultery and ‘gaming’ and desertion and manslaughter, and assumpsit and 
replevin and mandamus, and the trespass of cattle and the payment for 
arresting a horse thief”100 graduating to cases which dealt with the 
infringement of a water wheel patent, land disputes, railroad right of way 
disputes and winning tax exempt status for what was to become his most 
lucrative client—the Illinois Central Railroad. 
 Perhaps the most striking example of Lincoln’s integrity was the way that 
he handled a snub in the course of defending a patent infringement case 
brought in 1854 by Cyrus McCormick against John Manny of Rockford, 
Illinois.  McCormick claimed that Manny had violated one of McCormick’s 
patents for his reaper.  Lincoln had been brought in as part of the defense 
team by the Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. lawyers heading up the case 
and was to act as local counsel because the matter was set to be tried in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago.  
Lincoln took the initiative in investigating the facts of the case by making a 
trip to inspect his client’s reaper in Rockford, performing legal research, and 
writing out a long legal argument.  
  Yet, the lead eastern lawyers in the case—deciding secretly that they 
wanted to retain a more impressive and formally educated local counsel, 
Edwin M. Stanton—intentionally kept Lincoln in the dark: they ignored his 
correspondence, they failed to notify him that the case had been transferred 
to Cincinnati, Ohio, and they purposefully refrained from sending him the 
pleadings in the litigation.  Undeterred, Lincoln found out, through direct 
communications with the client, of the new venue and trial date for the case 
and took the trouble to travel by train to Cincinnati for what, he thought, 
would be his participation in the defense of McCormick v. Manny.  To add 
insult to injury, Stanton and his colleagues from Philadelphia and Washington, 
D.C. refused to walk with Lincoln from the Cincinnati railroad platform 
(where Lincoln had, by chance, met his fellow lawyers) to their hotel; refused 
to have him sit at counsel table with them; refused to invite him to dinner 
during the trial; and refused to even look at the written argument Lincoln had 
prepared for the case.  Lincoln chose to listen closely to the arguments made 
                                                                                                                           
99. Lincoln practiced law in three partnerships: first as a junior partner with John T. 
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by the lawyers in the case to learn more about law and advocacy by watching 
the full blown, multi-day trial. 
 Ultimately, Lincoln refused the agreed-upon legal fee that he had been 
promised when the Washington lawyer sent him a check in the mail, writing 
back that because he had made no actual argument in the case he did not 
deserve any fee beyond the original retainer that he had received when first 
approached about the case by the eastern lawyers.  What is even more 
amazing—and telling of Lincoln’s integrity—is that seven years later, in 1862, 
when he, as the President of the United States, needed to replace his original 
Secretary of War, he decided to turn to Edwin M. Stanton who (despite his and 
his colleagues’ outrageously rude treatment of Lincoln some ten years before 
and Stanton’s attacks on Lincoln during the presidential campaign of 1860) 
had gained the reputation of being an able government administrator, albeit as 
a Democrat, and not a Republican like Lincoln.  Lincoln did not succumb to 
understandable vindictiveness.  Lincoln did the best that he was able to do in 
1854 and 1855 after being retained as local counsel.  Lincoln swallowed his 
personal pain and injury and magnanimously returned the check for legal fees 
because he thought that he had not earned the extra money.  Lincoln, as 
President, put the Nation’s interests over his own bruised ego in choosing to 
appoint Stanton as the Secretary of War.  Indeed, a glimpse of Lincoln’s inner 
thoughts on the importance of integrity—as a lawyer, as a statesman, as a 
human being—can be achieved by considering his own words: “I am not 
bound to win, but I am bound to be true.  I am not bound to succeed, but I 
am bound to live up to what light I have;”101 “I desire so to conduct the 
affairs of this administration that if at the end, when I come to lay down the 
reins of power, I shall at least have one friend left, and that friend shall be 
down inside me;”102 “If you are resolutely determined to be a lawyer, the 
thing is more than half done already;”103 “Discourage litigation.  Persuade 
your neighbors to compromise whenever you can . . . .  As a peace maker the 
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good [person].  There will still be 
business enough.”104 
 Following the path of integrity in the practice of law also involves making 
sure that one makes and takes the time to contribute—free of charge—to the 
public interest.  In a way, therefore, taking time to sit on the board of 
directors of a local non-profit nursing home, or representing, pro bono, in a 
private nuisance lawsuit, a farm family who suffers involuntary exposure to 
pesticides from downwind drift coming from a mixing station on a 
neighboring agricultural cooperative’s land, or volunteering to serve on a 
county hospital’s citizen advisory board, or offering to distribute campaign 
literature for a candidate for state senate—all contributions of time, talent and 
                                                                                                                           
101. THE WIT AND WISDOM OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: AN A-Z COMPENDIUM OF 
QUOTES FROM THE MOST ELOQUENT OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 103 (Alex Ayers, ed., 1992). 
102. Id. at 44.  
103. Id. at 115. 
104. Id. 
2009] The Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer? 117  
 
integrity to the public interest—also implicate the first lawyerly virtue of balance, 
discussed above.105   
 In sum, therefore, seeking integrity is a necessary secondary virtue of being 
a good lawyer or law student because, without integrity, one will—sooner or 
later—fail to persuade, fail to attract new clients, and fail to live up to the 
lofty expectations that the American people harbor for the legal profession.106 
3.  Idealism 
 Idealism is the fuel that powers acts of lawyerly service and sacrifice.  
Every act of idealism—quixotic, romantic, optimistic, starry-eyed, or visionary 
advocacy for a cause, a person, or an institution—expresses a lawyer’s highest 
self.  And, every missed opportunity to be idealistic diminishes a lawyer’s 
opportunity to make a difference in his or her chosen profession. 
 Lawyerly idealism is similar to idealism as a philosophical concept in that 
both emphasize the importance of “spirit” or “consciousness” in viewing the 
world.107  Thus, both the idealistic lawyer and the philosopher of idealism 
would agree that it is possible to transcend the here and now.  In particular, 
the virtue of idealism allows the lawyer to contend with injustice and bone-
headed laws for as long as it takes to reverse a client’s misfortune.  Moreover, 
the idealistic lawyer and the philosopher of idealism would probably join with 
one another in the Hegelian belief that the universe is governed by a 
dialectical invisible hand such that even bad can be transcended to produce 
good.   
 A proper understanding of idealism for a law student or a lawyer requires, 
first, a facility for shrugging off defeat—for being able to continue to fight the 
good fight.  As explained by the late Robert F. Kennedy—a lawyer, U.S. 
Attorney General, U.S. Senator, and candidate for President of the United 
States until his brutal assassination in 1968—this requires perspective: 
 We should, I believe, beware of the pitfalls described by Taine: Imagine a 
man who sets out on a voyage equipped with a pair of spectacles that magnify 
things to an extraordinary degree.  A hair on his hand, a spot on the tablecloth, 
the shifting fold of a coat, all will attract his attention; at this rate, he will not go 
far, he will spend his day taking six steps and will never get out of his room. 
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We have to get out of the room.
108 
 
 Second, the virtue of lawyerly idealism demands that the accumulation of 
riches not be the focus of a career in the law.  In words that should have a 
special resonance with lawyers and lawyers-to-be, Robert F. Kennedy also 
observed, in this regard, that another great task “is to confront the poverty of 
satisfaction—a lack of purpose and dignity—that inflicts us all.  Too much 
and too long, we seem to have surrendered community excellence and 
community values in the mere accumulation of material things.”109 
 In the third place, idealism in the law requires a youthful attitude: “This 
world demands the qualities of youth:  not a time of life but a state of mind, a 
temper of the will, a quality of the imagination, a predominance of courage 
over timidity, of the appetite for adventure over the love of ease.”110 
* * * 
 Idealism’s sister is Hope.  Whether or not our hopes involve justice for a 
favored cause, the compensation for an injured client, or the vindication of a 
cherished belief, hope is a foundation that makes idealism socially attractive 
and worthwhile.  As explained by a modern Englishman: 
Hope is a virtue independently of its [realization]; it is an intrinsic value, an end 
in itself, allied to courage and imagination, a positive attitude full of possibility 
and aspiration.  For that reason you discover more about a person when you 
learn about his hopes than when you count his achievements, for the best of 
what we are lies in what we hope to be.
111
 
 Idealism’s brother is Change.  An idealistic lawyer knows that, to paraphrase 
the words of Roscoe Pound, while law needs to be stable, it cannot stand still; 
it always must change—sometimes dramatically, sometimes interstitially—and 
this change can be exciting and worthwhile.112  As former educator and U.S. 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, John W. Gardner, wrote in his 
vital book, Self-Renewal: 
For men and women who have accepted the reality of change, the need for 
endless learning and trying is a way of living, a way of thinking, a way of being 
awake and ready.  Life isn’t a train ride where you choose your destination, pay 
your fare and settle back for a nap.  It’s a cycle ride over uncertain terrain, with 
you in the driver’s seat, constantly correcting your balance and determining the 
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direction of progress.  It’s difficult, sometimes profoundly painful.  But it’s 
better than napping through life.
113
 
* * * 
 Fortunately, we can look to paragons of idealism in the practice of law.  
One type of idealistic lawyer is known as a cause lawyer.  “Cause lawyering is a 
concept that brings together a number of modes of legal practice (public 
interest lawyering, civil rights and civil liberties lawyering, feminist lawyering, 
poverty lawyering, and the like under a single terminological umbrella).”114  
The common purpose of cause lawyers is to advance social or political causes 
that they believe in.  By way of illustration, a cause lawyer may be employed by 
an organization—such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the National Organization of Women, or 
Amnesty International—to pursue, on a full-time basis, the cause of a specific 
organization (for instance: civil rights, environmentalism, feminism, or human 
rights).  Alternatively, some lawyers who work for private law firms may 
devote a portion of their time to specific causes, while earning fees from 
individual or corporate clients to help subsidize the cause lawyering. 
 Another type of idealistic lawyer is a volunteer to community non-profit 
organizations that may require legal expertise in the running of their 
organizations.  The range of non-profit lawyering activities is broad.  Some 
examples include the following: 
counsel to a local United Way organization facing questions of improprieties in 
paying the compensation package of the full-time executive director; 
legal advice to a community advocacy group for mentally retarded individuals 
regarding state law standards and procedures for assuming legal guardianship of 
disabled adults; 
legal services for a church in crafting a parking lot compact with a local business 
that provides for the sharing of scarce parking spaces for both the for-profit and 
the church. 
* * * 
 One legal commentator, James Coleman, Jr., wrote that “[w]hat sculpture is 
to marble, idealism is to the legal profession.”115  We should take special note 
of Coleman’s perspective on the rewards of being a lawyer; he contends that 
“despite the bad apples and the fact a lot of idealism seems to have faded, the 
underlying thrust of being a lawyer has given me joy, enthusiasm, and 
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relationships I could not find in any other occupation or profession.”116  
Moreover, he argues that: “I truly like lawyers (most of them) — their 
intellectual stimulation, their wide range of interests, their willingness to 
defend some of the most obscure causes, and their overall humanity”117 in 
pursuing their profession. 
 Yet, some in the legal community are concerned that idealism is no longer 
taught in law school as a virtue worth cultivating.  Shin Imay puts it this way: 
“As lawyers, we are taught from the moment we enter law school to temper 
our emotionalism, quash our idealism.”118  Michael B. Keating, a former 
President of the Boston Bar Association, expresses the problem in the 
following language: 
 I worry about the future of our profession.  Not that our services will be 
less important or less economically self-sustaining.  I worry that we are losing 
the idealism that made practicing law a great profession.  By idealism I mean the 
belief that practicing law is a calling to service — to our clients, to our 
community and to our system of justice.  That idealism is what should give value 
to the endeavor because it shapes what we do with opportunity.  I am 
particularly concerned that this idealism is no longer advanced to the younger 
generation of lawyers as an important part of our profession and — equally 
important — their development as lawyers.  I do not think this bodes well for 
the future of the profession.
119
 
 What is the problem?  Why does idealism suffer in the practice of law in 
America in the early twenty-first century?  What is to be done?  Perhaps, 
Professor Thomas L. Shaffer has a point when he argues that the most serious 
ethical issue facing American lawyers is their love for excessive amounts of 
money in remuneration for their services.120  Maybe law schools should teach 
law students “to do good”—to be concerned about representing the poor.121  
As part of this new curriculum of idealism, it might be a good idea to explain 
that time is a precious commodity for a lawyer and that taking time to meditate 
“in a less pressured environment, where there is an opportunity for reflection” 
often yields a “less self-serving” and “more idealistic” vision of one’s 
professional role.122  Moreover, to pursue idealism in his or her life, a lawyer 
should try to avoid “dual personalities;” to realize that like the attorney-
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protagonist, Atticus Finch, in Harper Lee’s novel, To Kill a Mockingbird,123 “she 
can’t live one way in town and another way in her home;”124 to fathom the 
wisdom, however, that sometimes a lawyer looking for answers in his or her 
quest for idealism needs to change jobs, seek a smaller firm, or seek a less-
harried lifestyle.125  Indeed, for law schools to inculcate the need for law 
students to pursue idealistic goals in their chosen profession, learning to “think 
like a lawyer,” as explained by Yale Clinical Professor of Law Stephen Wizner, 
might not be enough.126  Wizner trumpets the advice given to new law 
students by Abraham Lincoln in 1850: 
 There is a vague popular belief that lawyers are . . . dishonest ….  [But] . . .  
[l]et no [one] choosing the law for a calling . . . yield to the popular belief—
resolve to be honest at all events; and if in your own judgment you cannot be an 
honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without being a lawyer.  Choose some other 
occupation, rather than one in the choosing of which you do, in advance, 
consent to be a knave.
127
 
 Idealism, in sum, is a destabilizing virtue.  It undercuts one’s enemies.  It 
attracts energy and good fortune.  It does not depend on cognitive activity, but 
mixes well with creativity.  Ultimately, I believe that idealism is suffused with 
generosity.  The Australian writer, Stephanie Dowrick, speaking of generosity 
in the following passage was, also, speaking of idealism: 
 If every one of our lives is to be worth living, and if we are to come to 
realise in time that our planet is worth saving, it will be because we have allowed 
ourselves to discover the radiant power and ease, magic and beauty of 
generosity: the spaciousness of it, the joy of it, the colour and wonder of it; the 
immensity of it, the infinity of it. 
 It is in giving that we receive/It is in pardoning that we are pardoned; and/It is in 
dying that we are born to eternal life.
128
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4.  Compassion 
 According to the Once-ler, a character in my favorite Dr. Seuss book, The 
Lorax, as he surveys a landscape of denuded trees brought about by his own 
avarice: 
“But now,” says the Once-ler, “Now that you’re here, the word of the Lorax 
seems perfectly clear.  UNLESS someone like you cares a whole awful lot, 
nothing is going to get better.  It’s not.”
129
 
 Michael N. Dolich, a young Pennsylvania lawyer who has embraced the 
concept of being a “holistic lawyer,” seems to mirror the Lorax’s credo of 
caring.  According to Dolich, holistic lawyers understand how their thoughts 
and actions impact others and the whole world.130  Holistic lawyers learn that 
“the quality that elevates us from being a great lawyer and moves us into the 
next level is simply caring.”131  Dolich came to his insight after a period of travel, 
study, and reflection, triggered when he quit his lucrative personal injury law 
practice, sold his home, and stored all of his possessions in his friend’s 
basement.  He made the following startling assertion which, at its heart, 
emphasizes the importance of lawyerly compassion as a professional virtue: 
 Most of us are not aware of how meaningful our job really is.  I am not 
writing about an intellectual exercise in how the legal system impacts our 
culture, for all we know that it does.  The new challenge facing our profession is 
finding a way to experience, in a fully conscious way, how our actions and 
thoughts impact each and every other person in the never-ending web of 
relationships called life.  In essence, I am referring to the conscious evolution 
[lawyers must go through] from intellectually knowing our work has meaning 
into the actual experience and feeling of such meaning.  When this happens our 
work [as lawyers] becomes joyful.
132
 
 Professor Leonard L. Riskin, in a recent article, picked up on the holistic 
lawyer approach advocated by Dolich by cataloguing a number of “new” 
approaches to law school and lawyering.133  According to Riskin, these new 
approaches focus on “the need for a special kind of ability to deliberate, which 
includes both compassion and detachment.”134  These approaches: 
                                                                                                                           
129. DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971). 
130. Michael N. Dolich, Finding Joy in the Practice of Law, PA LAW, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 34, 
34. 
131. Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 
132. Id. at 34. 
133. Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of 
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
134. Id. at 19 (citing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 72 (1993)). 
2009] The Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer? 123  
 
[B]ear names such as therapeutic jurisprudence; preventative law; holistic 
lawyering; interest-based negotiation (sometimes called problem-solving, 
collaborative, or integrative); collaborative law; lawyering with an ethic of care; 
affective lawyering; the lawyer as problem solver; the lawyer as healer; 
transformative mediation or facilitative-broad mediation; and [r]estorative 
[j]ustice.
135
 
 Riskin goes on to argue that these various types of “[m]indfulness 
mediation” can “help a lawyer deal with selfish needs . . . by helping the lawyer 
develop a sense of compassion for and connection with other people, 
especially his clients and others affected by him (including those sitting across 
the table).”136  In the final analysis, however, for Riskin, the lawyerly virtue of 
compassion is an instrumental means of helping to achieve the ultimate 
lawyerly goal of “clarity and delicate balance essential for making wise 
choices.”137 
 Steven Keeva, author of a book on “transforming” the practice of law,138 
has pointed out how lawyers’ lack of compassion and empathy for their clients 
often gets in the way of their ability to render appropriate legal advice and 
care.  As he wrote in a recent article: 
 Among the complaints the non-lawyer public makes about lawyers, many 
suggest a sense that they tend to put process above people.  In fact, this 
complaint seems to be emblematic of a whole range of grievances that describe 
a profession populated by practitioners who are more concerned with the 
case—that is, an artificial construct—than with the person sitting across the 
desk. . . .  
 My impression . . . is that what troubles so many [former clients] is a sense 
that certain mindsets and attitudes stand between them and the lawyers they 
hire.  Several implied questions are clear, including: why can’t they (i.e., lawyers) 
just talk to me like normal human beings?  What is it about practicing law that 
makes people so unreal, so detached from the rhythms and concerns of 
everyday life?  I believe that research suggesting that non-lawyers see lawyers as 
dominant and aggressive professionals who are lacking in caring and compassion, supports 
my impression, since real people let their guards down now and then and do not 
frame every situation in dry, legalistic terms.  They understand that people who came to 
them in need, often at moments of great suffering, can use a strong, but also caring hand.
139
 
 Indeed, Keeva advocates the ambitious goal of lawyers and law students of 
realizing their “fullest flowering as . . . compassionate, conscious human 
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being[s].”140  Perhaps the potential for the practice of compassionate lawyering 
has undergone a sea change as a result of September 11, 2001, which has 
induced many Americans, including lawyers, “to re-examine their lives, their 
relationships, values and purposes on this earth.”141  A compassionate lawyer, 
looking at the big picture of a client’s overall interests as opposed to the 
limited context of a specific dispute, chooses to “take more time with a client 
to understand the client’s life and lifestyle and the client’s business, going 
beyond the immediate facts of the proposed deal or the perceived conflict.”142  
In structuring a transaction or a dispute settlement, a compassionate lawyer 
can meet his or her basic obligation to a client while providing healing advice 
that can address not only the client’s immediate problem but, perhaps, prevent 
it from happening again in a different form.143  The experience of an 
environmental lawyer, Tom Lynch, who represented a corporate client with a 
pollution problem at one of its facilities, is instructive of the power of being a 
compassionate attorney: 
The company prudently took immediate damage-control measures to address 
the contamination problem quietly and efficiently.  For several years, on Tom’s 
advice, it avoided communication with the media and its neighbors out of fear 
that disclosing past problems might lead to litigation.  When a company 
representative had to appear at a public meeting as part of the process to 
upgrade its treatment system, Tom was chosen to speak.  He had just finished 
reading Seeing Law Differently, Views From a Spiritual Path by Alain Reid, a 
Canadian lawyer, and the book gave him an inspiration.  At the meeting, he 
apologized to the community for having advised his client to maintain a low 
profile.  Instead, he and his environmental consultant disclosed precisely what 
had been done to remediate the problem and invited the community to 
participate in plant tours during which the state-of-the-art environmental clean-
up equipment could be examined.  The community’s concern and anger 
dissipated by this cathartic event, and the community has worked with the 
company since then.  Expensive litigation was avoided, and the relationship 
between the company and the community was significantly improved.  This 
approach was consistent with the basic premise and major tenets of holistic and 
compassionate lawyering.  Compassion, information sharing, cooperation and 
understanding on both sides encouraged community and commonality of 
purpose.  There was no call for blame and no need for the waste of resources in 
litigation.
144
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 This account of compassionate lawyering brings to mind the need to 
overcome fear in the process of finding our professional style.  It reminds me 
of the marvelous Albert Brooks film, Defending Your Life.145  In that movie, the 
protagonist finds himself at an intermediate waystation, called Judgment City, 
after he dies, charged with the task of justifying the life he lived on earth.  If he 
“wins” he goes onto a heavenly afterlife; if he loses, he gets sent back to earth 
to have another go at living.  During the course of a trial-like proceeding, 
taking several days in Judgment City, Brooks’ character is confronted with 
multiple times during his life (all mysteriously “recorded” and played back in 
the courtroom on a big screen) when he experienced fear: fear of standing up 
to a schoolyard bully; fear of expressing his affection for the woman he loved; 
fear of the unknown.  The lesson of this great movie, applied to the law, is that 
while we do not really know what will greet us on this side of life, or how we 
will ultimately be held to account, we should have the courage and fortitude to 
go against the grain; to practice our craft as lawyers in a deeply compassionate 
way—being mindful of the long-range, important interests of our clients and 
ourselves. 
 The virtue of compassion in the law, therefore, is related to the virtue of 
courage in the law—which will be discussed next.146  The virtue of lawyerly 
compassion, moreover, is also related to the cognate virtue of integrity, 
discussed above.147  As poignantly and beautifully expressed by Professor 
Loder: 
The good news is nonetheless considerable for lawyers who do nurture integrity.  
Each temptation is at once an occasion for growth.  Each caution is a call to 
conscientious reflection.  A lawyer reaching for moral wisdom has unusual 
opportunities to enlarge perspective through exploring the moral personalities 
of others.  Over time, this can enhance altruistic motivations and respect for the 
intrinsic worth of every person.  In consciously trying to appreciate new 
perspectives to improve legal effectiveness, the conscientious lawyer regularly 
exercises moral skills like empathy, imagination, and critical judgment.  These 
personal and interpersonal skills build fruitful relationships, and they also 
heighten sensitivity toward injustice in ways that can be legally as well as morally 
helpful.  Ideally, connecting with clients promotes sympathy and compassion that propel the 
lawyer motivationally, and thus sustainably, toward helping action.  The lawyer can 
incorporate the ability to recognize and correct injustice into her distinctive 
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integrity.  On all but the most positivist notions of justice, this perceptual and 
affective equipment is invaluable.
148
 
 In sum, the virtue of compassion tugs on our consciences to go the extra 
mile, implores our better angels to forgive a past slight or injustice, summons 
our character to face a parade of horribles—to move on, declare victory, and 
realize that life is good. 
5.  Courage 
 Every law student and practicing lawyer will likely face moments when he is 
called upon to face fears, stand up for what is right, or dig down deep to find 
the mystic fuel of courage to do what must be done.  Courage is a lawyerly 
virtue of great importance because lawyers are frequently called upon to 
represent unpopular clients or causes.  And, sooner or later a lawyer will have 
to argue for acceptance of a novel legal argument before a court, legislature, or 
administrative agency. 
 We are blessed in our efforts to try to think about courage in a lawyer’s 
professional life because there is a rich assortment of source material on the 
subject—in works on philosophy, in historical writings, in imaginative 
literature, in memoirs and letters of prisoners, soldiers, and adventurers.149   
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[T]o the puzzlement of his parents and others, he chose not to go into the 
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 But he said, “No.”  In a way, very much like Socrates, deciding to go to 
what he knew might be danger and death.  He sailed back to Germany, and 
he said—again, reminiscent of Socrates, whom he so admired—“As soon 
as I was on that boat, my spirit became quiet, for I knew that I was doing 
what I was destined to do.” 
 
1 J. RUFUS FEARS, BOOKS THAT HAVE MADE HISTORY: BOOKS THAT CAN CHANGE 
YOUR LIFE: 10-11 (2005).  
Bonhoeffer—convicted of treason against Hitler’s Third Reich—was 
executed by hanging on April 9, 1945, a few days before the end of the war in 
Europe.   
 
 The last thing that Bonhoeffer did before he was led to the scaffold was 
to take his book of Plutarch, which had been the last book sent to him at 
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 A good book to start with is a work by a University of Michigan law 
professor, William Ian Miller, The Mystery of Courage.150 This meditation on 
courage starts off with an introduction entitled “The Good Coward.”151  
Drawing upon a battlefield memoir by a Union soldier during the Civil War, 
Miller notes that those who have discussed the meaning of courage “place it 
either first among virtues” or close to the top.152  He observes, in this regard, 
that “[c]onstrued narrowly as the capacity to face death in feud or war, courage 
was frankly granted to be necessary to defending self, family, and one’s own 
against external threat, and thus absolutely crucial to securing the space in 
which other virtues could develop.”153  Moreover, Miller reflects that courage 
“[c]onstrued more broadly as fortitude . . . denote[s] a certain firmness of 
mind, a necessary component”154 of all virtues.  Miller realizes that it is 
important in thinking about courage to try to sketch out a psychology of 
courage.  He poses a number of incisive questions on the subject: 
[Courage] is clearly intimately connected with fear, but how?  Does true courage 
mean possessing a fearless character, being a person who “don’t scare worth a 
damn,” as one soldier said of Ulysses S. Grant; or does it require achieving a 
state of fearlessness by overcoming fear so as to send it packing by whatever 
feat of consciousness or narcotic that can do the trick?  Or does overcoming 
fear mean never quite getting rid of it, but just putting it in its proper place so 
that it doesn’t get in the way of duty?  Or does it mean being gripped by fear, 
feeling its inescapable oppressiveness, its temptations for flight and surrender, 
yet still managing to perform well in spite of it?
155
 
 Miller goes on to note that while “[a]ll virtues have histories and 
sociologies,” the virtue of courage and its corresponding vice, cowardice, are 
“more at the mercy of social and cultural context than some of the simpler 
virtues and vices.”156  Thus, while the simple virtue of temperance boils down 
to “don’t have more than x drinks, don’t eat until you get sick or fat, [and] 
don’t fornicate with more than one loved one and then not too much,”157 the 
complex virtue of courage cannot be so easily mapped out.  Using military 
metaphors that are potentially applicable to the practice of law, Miller makes 
the following argument in favor of acknowledging the complexity of courage: 
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The courage of aggression, the courage of offense, for instance, makes very 
different behavioral and psychological demands from the courage of defense; 
storming a wall requires a different kind of mustering of will and guts than 
enduring interrogation in an Argentinean prison or internment in a gulag or 
death camp.  There is a courage of dishing it out and a courage of taking it.  Not all that 
infrequently the same action can with justice be described as an example of 
courage or of cowardice: thus suicide and the problem of the good coward.  
And cowardice, which as an initial matter seems easier to get a grip on than 
courage, suffers from courage’s complexity.  What is the status of retreat?  Of 
surrender?  Of trickery and cunning?  Of guerrilla warfare?  Of politeness and 
good manners, tolerance and prudence?
158
 
 Political courage is analogous to the courage a practicing lawyer may have 
to endure, thus John F. Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage159 is also a worthwhile 
book for attorneys to peruse.  The book is instructive not only because it 
portrays an assemblage of politicians who were trained as lawyers (such as 
John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster, George Norris and Robert A. Taft), but 
also because it discusses the kinds of cases and controversies that practicing 
lawyers—by dint of their representation of controversial clients or unpopular 
causes—sooner or later get involved with.  Indeed, the late President Kennedy 
summed up his book in language that should offer hope and inspiration for 
lawyers everywhere: 
[T]he same basic choice of courage or compliance continually faces us all, 
whether we fear the anger of constituents, friends, a board of directors or our 
union, whenever we stand against the flow of opinion on strongly contested 
issues.  For without belittling the courage with which [people] have died, we 
should not forget those acts of courage with which [people] . . . have lived.  The 
courage of life is often a less dramatic spectacle than the courage of a final 
moment; but it is no less a magnificent mixture of triumph and tragedy.  A 
[person] does what he must—in spite of personal consequences, in spite of 
obstacles and dangers and pressures—and that is the basis of all human 
morality.
160
 
 To be courageous, according to JFK, “requires no exceptional 
qualifications, no magic formula, no special combination of time, place and 
circumstance.  It is an opportunity that . . . is presented to us all.  Politics 
merely furnishes one arena which imposes special tests of courage.”161  Thus, 
“[i]n whatever arena of life one may meet the challenge of courage, whatever 
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may be the sacrifices he [or she] faces if he [or she] follows his [or her] 
conscience—the loss of his [or her] friends, his [or her] fortune, his [or her] 
contentment . . . each [person] must decide for himself [herself] the course he 
[or she] will follow.”162 
 In the realm of lawyerly courage, judges face a unique challenge.  As 
explained by Professor Charles Fried, “[u]nlike lawyers who advocate for one 
party, unlike [law] professors who … kibitz on the sideline, the judge has to 
take a decision” and “live with the (internal) consequences of his decision.”163   
 At times, lawyers must stand up to their clients and exercise moral courage 
in giving advice.  Professor Robert F. Cochran, Jr. makes an interesting 
distinction, in this regard, between weak and powerful clients, on the one 
hand, and weak and powerful lawyers, on the other hand.  Cochran argues: 
There are two factors that should influence the level of intensity with which the 
lawyer engages the clients: the balance of power between the lawyer and client 
and the danger that the actions being considered pose to other people.  When 
the [predominance] of power [is] primarily on the lawyer’s side, the lawyer should 
hesitate to exercise power over the client.  When the determinants are equal or 
primarily on the side of the client, the lawyer is unlikely to overcome the client 
and can feel freer to express opinions about the decisions that must be made. . . .   
If the lawyer is to involve the client in moral discourse and not dominate the 
client, she may need to act against her instincts.  The powerful lawyer may need 
to work to respect the dignity of the weak client; the weak lawyer may need 
courage to confront the powerful client.
164
 
 Courage, according to Dean Bruce R. Jacob, is “[o]ne of the most 
important character traits of outstanding lawyers,” which, in his view, is 
“[c]losely related [to] the trait of independent-mindedness.”165  As more fully 
explained by Jacob: 
A lawyer must not be one who always runs with the crowd or feels pressured by 
society to conform to the common mold.   He or she must have the intellectual 
integrity to make decisions independently and the fortitude to abide by them 
even in the face of hostility from others.  For example, a criminal defense lawyer 
may be spat upon by outraged citizens while walking through the corridors of a 
courthouse on his or her way to defend an especially unpopular client.  
Immense personal courage is necessary in such a situation if one is to provide 
the best possible defense.  Similarly, a lawyer who becomes aware of the fact 
that the officers of a client corporation, to assure a large profit, are making a 
decision which will result in unconscionable pollution of the environment, must 
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be sufficiently independent-minded to determine that his client’s decision is 
wrong, and must have the courage to advise the officers against making such a 
decision.  The attorney must do so even though the attorney knows that in so 
advising he or she may lose that corporation as a client and may lose the fee 
income generated from that client.
166
 
 Erica Bose chronicled a case of courageous lawyering in a 1999 law review 
article.167  Ms. Boise pointed out that “[f]rom the late 1940s to the early 1960s 
very few attorneys had the courage and conviction to oppose [Congress] … 
but some did and such courage merits acknowledgment.”168  Sadly, however, 
the courageous attorneys paid a high price in personal stress, professional 
ostracism, and financial loss for their brave actions, but such is the nature of 
the practice of law.  Resolving to “do the right thing”—and then doing it with 
energy and gusto—is what lawyers are challenged to do every day that they go 
to work.169  American lawyers have a rich tradition of courage at the bar going 
all the way back to attorney John Adams of Massachusetts.  Adams exercised 
courage on numerous occasions throughout his legal career: in helping to draft 
the Braintree Resolutions contesting heavy-handed British taxation in the 
American colonies;170 in defending four American sailors “charged with 
murder for the death of an English naval officer who had boarded an 
American vessel seeking to seize sailors and press them into service in the 
British Navy” before the American Revolution;171 and, most famously, in 
representing Captain Preston and the other British soldiers under his 
command in the Boston Massacre case of 1770.172 
 Former Yale Law School Dean Anthony T. Kronman sees a relationship 
between a lawyer’s love for the law and the ability to exercise lawyerly courage.  
Kronman wrote: “the more a lawyer values the well-being of the law, the more 
likely he is to be able to summon such courage when needed. . . .  This internal 
anchorage of his devotion to the law in the good lawyer’s craft gives it a 
strength and resilience it would not otherwise have.”173   
 In sum, for lawyers courage is a cardinal virtue.  Courage is closely 
related—and sometimes analogized—to integrity, because to be whole as a 
legal professional one must stand up for what is right and oppose what is 
wrong regardless of the personal consequences.  A lawyer who is balanced in 
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the practice of his or her chosen profession and in the living of his or her life 
will also value courage as a way to achieve integrity.  And, to be courageous as 
a lawyer—instead of doing the safe or profitable thing—entails the exercise of 
both idealism and compassion for others. 
 Lawyers can gain strength from the biblical injunction: “Be strong and of a 
good courage; be not afraid, neither be . . . dismayed . . . .”174 
6.  Creativity 
 The virtue of creativity for lawyers and law students is critically important.  
Yet, for at least three reasons, lawyerly creativity is under-appreciated.  One 
reason is that some view the law as an inherently restraining craft—rather than 
a capacious discipline—that necessarily stifles innovation.  Second, many 
observers contend that the need for specialization and sub-specialization (to 
manage the torrent of complex new statutes, developing case law, and 
voluminous revised regulations) compels a narrowness of focus that inhibits 
inventiveness and originality.  A third reason for the conventional professional 
wisdom that severely discounts the role of creativity in the practice and 
learning of law concerns the time pressures faced by every law student and 
lawyer in America just to keep up and stay current: If one needs to run just to 
stay in place, as this line of thinking goes, it is unrealistic to expect those who 
must deal with the law to be creative. 
 If we shift our perspective a bit, however, the limitations of the law, the 
need for professional specialization, and time pressures can be viewed as 
forces that should encourage lawyerly creativity.  In this regard, the practice of 
law can be analogized to the ancient art of rhetoric.  Both law and rhetoric 
involve the study and mastery of the available means of persuasion in a given 
case.  The good lawyer and the good law student must learn, therefore, how to 
navigate amid the constraints posed by the audience and the situation while 
remaining ready to take advantage of tactical opportunities for persuasion that 
present themselves. 
 Indeed, being able to “think like a lawyer”—a core value of legal 
professionalism—implicitly assumes the mastery of the virtue of creativity in 
making arguments regarding the interpretation of the law.  Professor Wilson 
Huhn touches on this subject in his marvelous book, The Five Types of Legal 
Argument: 
 It is true that in law school students dedicate thousands of hours to the 
job of memorizing the holdings of cases and preparing course outlines, and that 
this is no easy task.  But memorizing case holdings and course outlines is only 
half of what students must learn in law school, and it is the easy half. 
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 The truly hard part of law school, and the part that makes a legal 
education truly useful, is mastering the art of legal analysis.  Students must learn 
not only the rules of law, the case holdings and course outlines, but must also 
learn how courts interpret the law and create it.  It is not enough to know what 
the law has been; it is also necessary to develop the [creative] ability to predict 
what it may become.  Students must master this skill because it is basic to 
representing clients competently. 
 The purpose of legal education is to teach students “how to think like 
lawyers.”  Students must learn how to make arguments for a favorable 
interpretation of an existing rule of law, or for the adoption of a new rule of law.  
To do this students must be able to recognize the different types of legal 
arguments, and understand the strengths and weaknesses of each type of 
argument.
175
 
 As Huhn explains in his book, it requires creativity and inventiveness to 
comprehend and to use the five basic types of legal argument, applicable 
across the board in every field of law from admiralty to zoning, which include: 
(1) text-based arguments, (2) claims based on intent, (3) precedent-focused 
contentions, (4) arguments rooted in tradition, and (5) policy analysis.176  
Professor Huhn points out in this regard that because “[t]he law is not smooth 
and pure like distilled water,” but, rather, is like a “wild river” that is “fed by 
tributaries which arise from myriad wellsprings;” in order to “master the law” 
we must imaginatively “trace each and every legal argument to its source.”177  
Utilizing creativity, himself, Huhn provides an alternative image of the law as 
consisting of “different voices.”178  He asserts that “the greatest challenge we 
face in studying the law is to recognize and understand each of the voices of 
the law, and to express ourselves with every voice.”179 
 When we discuss the interaction of creativity with the law, reference to 
historian Daniel J. Boorstin’s classic, The Creators, is both instructive and 
inspirational.180  Reviewing three thousand years of artistic achievements—
from the Egyptian pyramid builders to Picasso—Boorstin portrays the 
outstanding individuals and cultures that have given us our legacy of enriching 
architecture, painting, sculpture, music, drama, dance and literature.  At the 
start of a part of his book called “Creator Man,” Boorstin quotes Paul Valéry 
who said: “The artists’s whole business is to make something out of 
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nothing.”181  Then, probing the origins of the human instinct to create, 
Boorstin observes: 
 Man’s power to make the new [merged with] the power to outlive himself 
in his creations.   He found the materials of immortality in the stone around him 
or the artificial stone that he could make.  He flexed his muscles of creativity in 
structures whose purpose would remain a mystery, and in temples of 
community.  He dared to make images of himself and of the life around him.  
He made his words into worlds, to relive his past and reshape his future.
182
 
 So too, lawyers must never forget that they are artists—of language, of 
argumentation, of persuasion.  In exercising the virtue of creativity, lawyers 
should draw upon their life experiences and insights about human relations.  
This is the beginning of the Valéryian process of making “something out of 
nothing.”  But, the creative process applied to the law also requires the hard-
edged attributes of habit and knowledge, labor and logic, and memory and 
imagination.  As to habit and knowledge, every lawyer remembers their 
fledgling experience as a new law student being confronted with their first set 
of examinations; he or she learned how to draw upon the knowledge of legal 
concepts imparted in casebooks and by law professors, and to put this learning 
into a form that has been referred to by pithy acronyms such as “ILAC”—
issue, law, analysis and conclusion or “IRAC”—issue, reasoning, application 
and conclusion.  This was not easy, at first, but with practice, feedback, and 
comparison with model answers of course, “honor papers” resulted and the 
taker’s knowledge was improved and strengthened. 
 As to labor and logic, a good lawyer comes to learn that a modicum of 
mental, physical, and emotional pain is required in writing briefs, drafting wills 
and contracts, and composing opinion letters for clients.  Litigators, to be sure, 
routinely face the rigors of sleepless nights, severe time pressures, and high 
stake contests.  But, even non-litigating, transactional lawyers are called upon 
to endure similar kinds of pain in the process of legal creativity.  In 
metaphysical terms, logic enters the picture of lawyerly creativity by acting as 
an aid to labor: like a pilot that steers the lumbering ship of a daunting case or 
assignment into harbor.  Thus, approaching a law-related project in a logical 
fashion allows the lawyer to break the big jobs into smaller, more manageable, 
parts.  And, framing a legal problem with the logic of human limits allows one 
to rest easy in the realization that no lawyer ever has all the time he or she 
wished to research an issue or to compose an argument. 
 As to the role of memory and imagination in lawyerly creativity, the 
teaching of Socrates in the Meno is apt.  Socrates informed Meno that what we 
call learning is really only a process of recollection.183  While Socrates might 
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have been pressing the matter a bit too far, the point is this: creativity beckons 
us to review our common sense experiences, concepts, and knowledge.  And, 
with the addition of the magic ingredient of imagination—what some have 
referred to as “lateral thinking,” what others have called “vision,” and others 
dubbed “unorthodoxy”—new and original ways of thinking about a problem 
become apparent. 
 By way of illustration, Professor Monroe Freedman vividly discusses the 
creativeness imperative for good lawyering in an article about lawyers and 
death penalty cases.184  Freedman expresses, in this regard, three key insights 
about law and creativity.  First, “[t]he law is not always clear and never is static.  
Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be 
taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change.”185  Second, “[a] 
lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of 
the law to the ever-changing relationships of society.”186  Third, “new wisdom 
. . . [can be acquired by] discard[ing] old ignorance.”187  Freedman applied 
these three principles to the difficult task of representing a criminal convict 
facing the prospect of the death penalty.  He argued that lawyers need not fear 
judicial sanctions if they can find a way of making novel arguments or claims 
in a good faith effort to change the law.  While the distinction between a 
“good faith” and “bad faith” effort to modify law is probably, in large 
measure, in the eyes of subjective judges, I think that what Freedman was 
getting at is the need for lawyers to show how their creative arguments are 
linked to mainstream legal arguments—found in the text of a constitution or 
statute, the intent of a legislature or administrative agency, existing precedent, 
civilized traditions, or wise social policy.  In seeking to be creative, therefore, 
lawyers should not ignore existing law, but should find new and insightful 
ways to build on this foundation to demonstrate what law can become. 
 While there are a variety of tactics and strategies to be creative in the 
practice of law, the following practical pointers may be useful. 
 1. Seek Clarity.  In many areas of the law, existing doctrines of principles 
are murky.  By showing a court how a new legal wrinkle (which incidentally 
helps your client’s cause) could clarify the particular area of law at bar (e.g., 
environmental law, patent law, tort law), an advocate is likely to make a court 
more receptive to considering a novel argument.188 
 2. Think Ahead.  Instead of reacting to events, litigators, as well as, 
transactional lawyers should take time in every matter that they are handling to 
imagine and plan for future contingencies.  For example, a business lawyer 
might bring up the possible impact of a corporate client’s record retention 
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policy on the possibility that some confidential records will be discovered in 
future litigation.189 
 3. Shift Perspective.  Lawyerly contentiousness and aggressive 
unpleasantness need not be the only ways for a lawyer to represent a client.  
“If a hammer is your only tool, every problem tends to look like a nail.”190  By 
consciously thinking of other ways to approach clients’ problems—like 
collaboration, mediation, or simple discussion—a lawyer can often achieve a 
more positive and cost-effective result.191 
 4. Remove Cognitive Barriers.  As pointed out in a recent article, “a lawyer 
cannot be effectively creative when her decision-making is undermined by 
cognitive biases that restrict her ability to envision innovative solutions to 
problems.”192  To help resolve this problem, a growing movement in legal 
education called therapeutic jurisprudence, or “T.J.,” attempts to “assess the 
psychological implications of legal processes” while helping lawyers become 
more sensitive and proactive in eliminating cognitive barriers in their own 
ways of thinking about problems, and in assessing and shaping the ways 
decision makers (like judges and juries) solve problems. 
 5. Try Word Play.  Lawyers are trained as law students to use different 
words and word combinations in researching the law.  Reconfiguring the 
words will often yield different and more pertinent case law, statutory 
references, or factual leads. 
 “Word Play” can also be used by lawyers in other creative contexts.  For 
example, experimenting with different language in a client opinion letter may 
make the advice clearer and more understandable.193  Likewise, generating 
different opening statements and summations in a pre-trial moot court 
exercise can help a litigator hone a message that delivers both logical 
cohesiveness and emotional resonance.194 
 In sum, the lawyerly virtue of creativity enables a lawyer to adapt to his or 
her clients’ particular problems in ways that best serve the clients’ interests—in 
resolving a dispute, in continuing a business relationship, in addressing deep-
seated psychological motivations and the like.  Being creative, however, 
requires help and sustenance from other lawyerly virtues.  For example, the 
virtue of compassion is needed to motivate a lawyer to take creative 
approaches to a client’s problem.  Moreover, the virtue of integrity reminds a 
lawyer that a client should be able to expect his or her attorney to provide 
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individualized attention and focused effort in handling the case.  Furthermore, 
because many would denounce the ability of lawyers to solve legal problems in 
a creative way, the virtues of courage and idealism can fortify the good lawyer 
to swim against the current. 
7.  Energy 
 Lawyers and law students require energy to accomplish their busy agendas.  
The dictionary definition of energy informs us of the multiple meanings of the 
word: “force; vigor; capacity for activity” and “the capacity . . .  to do 
work.”195  Synonyms for energy are more revealing: “force, power, strength, 
might, . . . drive, dynamism, push, élan, dash, bounce, brio, zip, go, vim, . . . 
get-up-and-go, pep, zing, . . . zap; vitality, liveliness, vivacity, animation, . . . 
spirit, . . . exuberance, zest, gusto, enthusiasm, verve, zeal, . . .  oomph, [and] 
pizzazz.”196  
 The word enervate, sharing the same root, is an antonym of energy, defined as 
to: “deprive of vigor or vitality.”197  Indeed, no lawyer or law student wants to 
be characterized as being enervated or to experience the many forms of 
enervation: “weaken, . . . weary, drain, tax, exhaust, sap, debilitate, enfeeble, 
fatigue, wear-out, dull, subdue, devitalize, . . . strain, break, crush, depress [or] 
dispirit.”198 
 On a deeper level than dictionary definitions, Professor P.M. Forni has 
articulated a more practical description of what human energy is all about.  
Forni speaks of energy in social terms—focusing on a coming out of self to 
embrace the interests and concerns of others.  As he explains: 
 We now live in an age of idolatry of the Self.  We have persuaded 
ourselves that first and foremost we live to realize our own Selves for our own 
good.  Having made the Self the central concern and value in our lives, we 
should not be surprised if self-centered behaviors have become more prevalent 
than altruistic ones.  We shouldn’t be surprised if civility has suffered.  The 
more we focus on our Selves and our self-gratification, the less moral energy we have 
available to spend on others and the less attuned we are to others’ well-being.
199
 
 Two aspects of Forni’s description should resonate with those of us who 
labor in the law: the implication that people should try to be more altruistic 
than self-centered, and the notion that energy applied by human beings to 
fellow human beings is moral in nature.  In other words, when a lawyer 
chooses to represent a client or a cause he or she steps outside of themselves 
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to achieve something of considerable importance to another.  The tasks of 
finding, interpreting, and using legal materials are actually outside a client’s real 
concerns in the sense that an attorney should strive to frame a client’s problem 
in human terms before he or she defines the client’s concerns in legal terms.  
The virtuous lawyer, therefore, recognizes the challenge of conceptualizing 
client problems in concrete and practical terms; legal abstractions contained in 
judicial opinions, statutes, and regulations need to be paraphrased in ways that 
make sense and that advance justice for flesh and blood individuals. 
 The philosophy of Henri Bergson helps to clarify the importance of energy 
in a lawyer’s day-to-day existence.  Bergson coined the phrase élan vital.200  
While a precise meaning of élan vital is subject to speculation among 
philosophers, for our purposes it can be thought of as “life force” or “vital 
impetus,”201 what one writer describes as a “basic energy [that] has no 
specified or specifiable goal; it is a creative and originating force which 
produces endless variations of forms against which it then has to contend in 
order to create further variations.”202  Another useful formulation of Bergson’s 
philosophy of energy is that “[l]ife is essentially determined in the act of 
avoiding [or overcoming] obstacles, stating and solving a problem.”203  A 
lawyer, then, needs to understand that problem formulation is a critical part of his 
or her job and that searching for ways to describe and map out a client’s 
problem is a difficult and taxing process. 
 Power is a type of energy that roughly combines what we learned in high 
school physics as potential energy and kinetic energy.  Being physically and mentally 
fit creates potential energy; this energy is also enhanced by being prepared and 
conscientious.  Making the right moves—communicating with clients and 
colleagues, crafting the best arguments in a particular case, keeping abreast of 
new developments in your field—involves the use of kinetic energy to 
persuade others to give you what you want. 
 One of America’s competitive advantages in the international marketplace 
is the energetic style of American lawyers and law firms.  As explained in a 
recent law review article: 
The United States is involved in more cases at the International Court of Justice 
and the World Trade Organization than any other state.  More American 
businesses are involved in international commercial arbitration than any other 
nationality.  Americans are involved in significant numbers of international 
family law disputes.  Many U.S. citizens have ties to conflict areas of the world 
and want their government to play a role in helping resolve those conflicts.  
Eight out of ten “mega”-firms, firms with 2,000 lawyers or more, are American.  
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These firms market their broad expertise and experience so that even the 
German and Mexican governments called on American law firms to help 
prepare cases against the United States government at the International Court of 
Justice.  The sheer number of American lawyers, their energetic style, and commitment to the 
use of law in problem solving all account for the trend toward Americanization of dispute 
resolution.
204
 
 Indeed, American lawyers are energized by the prospect of doing well by 
doing right.  Thus, the American tort system, by way of a prominent example, 
holds out the prospect of lawyers recovering high damages for clients through 
such procedures as class action lawsuits and by virtue of the allowance of 
contingency fee contracts; this provides a strong financial incentive (which 
also is morally beneficial) for lawyers to demonstrate high quality, high 
powered legal representation for their injured clients.205 
 The American system of adversarial legalism also generates lawyerly energy.  
As Professor Robert Burns explains, “the energetic and strategic ethos of the 
trial bar contributes to the emergence of practical truth at trial.”206  The energy 
of American lawyers drives the process of truth-seeking and justice in very 
special ways.  Burns demonstrates why this is the case in the following 
profound excerpt: 
The ethos of the trial bar is to make the most impolite, embarrassing, or 
“politically incorrect” assertions, even if they are offensive to one or other 
sources of power.  The lawyer’s professional responsibility is to violate every 
code of silence if it is in the client’s interest.  The parties’ control over what 
assertions to make and what issues to raise is an important bulwark against there 
being only One Big Story.  It says, in effect, that there really is quite a bit that 
can be said on behalf of all persons, and most causes.  It knows that the mental 
laziness that does not raise uncomfortable questions can be a great enemy of human decency. . . 
.  
 The essential tension at trial is . . . between the competing theories and 
themes of the case, on the one hand, and the enormously detailed presentation 
of facts through the witnesses’ testimony.  The trial lawyer’s energetic advocacy, 
pressing far beyond polite conversation or politically correct discourse, is what creates this basic 
and enormously fruitful tension.  We would be much worse off without it.  Self-
censoring of the wrong kind would damage it. 
 This energy is at work throughout the trial.  The trial lawyer attacks his 
opponent’s stories on cross-examination, in closing argument, and by the 
presentation of extrinsic evidence.  He suggests that the witnesses’ accounts are 
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willful and partial constructions that are not completely truthful, that there is 
another way of looking at it.  Finally, he or she argues that the moral-political 
norms invoked by the opponent . . . do not quite fit here.
207
 
 The virtue of energy is essential for lawyers engaged in the strenuous 
practice of law and for law students struggling to absorb and comprehend the 
oceanic complexity of the law.  Indeed, a decent case could be made for 
ranking the virtue of energy at the top—or close to the top—of a list of 
lawyerly virtues because without the requisite energy to tackle problems, to 
interview clients, to research and analyze legal materials, to press for action in 
the courts, legislatures, and agencies, and to hold up in the face of adversity, a 
lawyer’s job could never be done.  In a way, the virtue of energy is analogous 
to the virtue of balance (which I have ranked first among lawyerly virtues).208  
I view the virtue of energy, however, as more visceral and physical than the 
virtue of balance (which I comprehend to be more spiritual and cerebral) and, 
therefore, of slightly lower importance.  So too, the virtues of integrity, 
idealism, compassion, courage and creativity209 are ranked prior to the virtue 
of energy because, as I see it, one must cultivate a robust spirituality to achieve 
a semblance of these “higher” virtues, whereas the virtue of energy can be, in 
large measure, accomplished by paying close attention to how one makes 
choices to act or not to act, to worry or not to worry, to indulge in sensual 
pleasures (and to what degrees)—matters more physical than spiritual. 
8.  Justice 
 As the lawyerly virtue of energy is moderately more physical and visceral 
than it is spiritual or cerebral,210 I also contend that the virtue of justice is 
similarly dominated by physical/visceral characteristics.  A compelling book 
that supports this presupposition is entitled The Sense of Justice: Biological 
Foundations of Law.211  According to Margaret Gruter, while “law [is] both . . . a 
creation of the human mind and . . . a product of the biological mechanisms 
that support and make possible the human quest for order and justice,” the 
human “sense of justice” seems to be hard-wired into our biological 
makeup.212  As Gruter muses on the subject: 
The possible universality of a program in the minds of individuals that urges 
them to strive for balance, for structure, for continuity of established values—all 
functions of which have legal counterparts—can be supported by scientific data.  
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The same point holds concerning the satisfaction individuals derive from staying 
within a given framework, which influences their legal behavior.
213
 
 Professor Roger D. Masters provides the following graphic examples of a 
visceral sense of justice shared by many: 
 On the evening of January 24, 1989, convicted mass murderer “Ted” 
Bundy was electrocuted at the Florida State Prison, thereby ending a prolonged 
series of legal maneuvers that had been used to forestall capital punishment.  
Given the notoriety of the case, the nightly TV news covered the event.  
Outside the prison, a group of citizens had gathered; when a loudspeaker 
announced that the medical examiner had pronounced Bundy dead, members of 
the crowd cheered, smiled, and expressed both happiness and relief.  These 
signs of pleasure were confirmed by comments to a journalist.  For at least some 
witnesses, the death of a convicted murderer elicited strong emotional responses as well as 
cognitive judgments of satisfaction: Justice was (finally) done.
214
 
 What a human being tends to have as a natural component of his or her 
biological makeup combines “elements of passion and reason, emotion and 
cognition, or feeling and judgment.  Behind these elements . . . is a sense of 
justice, a sense that is ever present yet manifest in different ways from case to 
case.”215  Professor Michael T. McGuire has theorized that humans’ complex 
social and legal behavior is rooted in the evolved information-processing 
capacity of the primate brain.216 From our primate ancestors of millions of 
years ago we have inherited so-called “Darwinian algorithms” driven by 
neurochemical and neuroanatomical processes that impact our abilities to 
assess reciprocal relations with others and to express anger at injustice when 
others do not reciprocate our good deeds, or reassurance, if the consequences 
are seen as consistent with expectations and therefore just.217  Professor 
Robert Frank elucidates the sense of justice from the viewpoint of cost-benefit 
calculus and rational choice theory.218  According to Frank, although 
Darwinian natural selection theory would predict that animals, including the 
human animal, would tend not to act against their own self-interest, “human 
behaviors often have costs to the individual that exceed immediate 
benefits.”219  In Frank’s view, “[t]he sense of justice is often invoked to explain 
such altruistic behavior, particularly when it is consistent with approved 
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cultural norms.”220  The implication of Frank’s analysis is that even though an 
individual’s sense of justice can bring about short-term costs that exceed 
benefits to the individual, in the long run, a sense of justice can result in the 
individual reaping benefits from others in the community who recognize the 
sacrifice a person has made for the larger social good and, thereby, reward the 
individual’s “selfless” action in some way. 
 For a lawyer, the virtue of justice would seem to be vital.  Some might even 
say that a just lawyer is a tautological concept—how could a lawyer be other 
than just?  And yet, from the lay public’s perspective, the legal profession is 
viewed by many to be dominated by lawyers who lack a sense of justice.  Those 
who espouse such a belief buy-in to the following notions: that lawyers care 
more about getting money for themselves than doing right for their clients; 
that lawyers will distort the facts and warp the law in pursuit of wealth 
maximization for themselves—the very antithesis of seeking justice. 
 St. John’s University law professor Lawrence Joseph has written a book—a 
cautionary tale about lawyers who have lost their sense of justice—which every 
member (or aspiring member) of the legal profession should read and meditate 
upon.  The book is called Lawyerland: What Lawyers Talk About When They Talk 
About Law.221  Professor Joseph portrays a hodge-podge of grasping, self-
absorbed, money-obsessed, petty, vindictive, and hollow attorneys, who sneer 
at or snort at, or despise the idea that lawyers should be concerned about 
doing justice.  Item #1: A lawyer named Robinson, a criminal defense lawyer, 
who is of the view that “[t]he criminal law represents civilization’s 
pathology.”222  Item #2: An attorney named Wylie who asks “[w]ho ever reads 
Supreme Court opinions?  I know I don’t.”223  Wylie does not care about the 
law, or the Supreme Court of the United States, or the social institution of the 
law; for him, “chaos” is what matters: “Complexity so intricate no one can 
fathom it.  Large things within small things, small things within large things—
things encompassing things which would seem to be beyond them.  Chaos.”224  
Anarchy.  Lawlessness.  Injustice.  Pandemonium.  Havoc.  Bedlam.  Babble.  
Higgledy-Piggledy.  Snafu (an American military slang meaning “situation-
normal-all-fucked-up”).  In Wylie’s world of law, injustice holds sway and 
lawyers are part and parcel of the whole rotten enterprise.  Speaking of 
another lawyer, Jack, who is consulting a psychiatrist, Wylie says this: 
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So what do you think triggers the doctor’s prognosis?  Jack, during one of his 
sessions, said that because he’s a lawyer he has to constantly split hairs.  Isn’t 
that perfect!  So what does the mind doctor say?  He tells Jack that, as a lawyer, 
he has to be capable of deep moral compromise.  You have to do things, be part 
of things, you don’t want to be part of.  You have to pretend to be what you’re 
not.  Well, you can’t argue with that.  We all know there are times when you’re 
working on some deal that, if you were to think it through, you’d realize that it 
was going to ruin the lives of thousands of people and their families.  We all do 
it—in one size, shape, form, or other.  According to the doctor, the split that 
occurs when we do this is subconscious.  It has to be.  If it weren’t, we couldn’t 
do it.  This, for the doctor, is a big, big deal.  He says that lawyers, when they do 
something they really don’t want to do, end up subconsciously sublimating their 
real feelings into – well, money, of course, and success.
225
 
 Item #3:  A federal district court judge named Day who refers to what she 
calls the “lawyer phenotype” which has as “[c]haracteristic number one” the 
propensity to lie.226  Incredibly, according to Judge Day, “[i]t’s inherent in the 
process.”227   
The tone of her voice was matter-of-fact.  Those who aren’t part of it—who 
don’t do it—are incapable of understanding it.  Lawyers know too much.  If you 
know too much, how don’t you lie?  Everything you say has another meaning.  
The posturing, the playacting, arguing over the smallest things, the narcissism, 
the beyond-belief egomania—it’s all part of that.  Too much meaning.
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 Lawyerland was the subject of a law review symposium.229  According to one 
symposium author, Joseph’s Lawyerland is a bleak, realistic landscape of lost 
souls with the irony that it describes a “two-dimensional prison that [its] 
inhabitants construct for themselves out of their torrent of [lawyerly] 
words.”230 
 Implicit in the view of another contributor to the symposium is the 
assessment that for many American attorneys pursuing justice is a laughable 
lie; just a cock-and-bull-story, being that “the overwhelming feelings the 
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lawyers in Lawyerland engender are alienation and despair.”231  Justice is an 
insider’s joke, then, for lawyers who, like one of Joseph’s real-life characters, 
muses in the language of Herman Melville that lawyers are “confidence-
men.”232 
 But, there is not universal alienation and despair.  And, not all lawyers are 
confidence-men.  On a more optimistic note, looking at what lawyers do for 
clients in the pursuit of justice in a particular case raises the fascinating 
comparison between the lawyerly duties of justice and the lawyerly duties of 
generosity and friendship.  What am I talking about?  Do lawyers have duties 
of generosity and friendship toward their clients?  I contend, most 
emphatically, that they do.  I claim that lawyers are expected by various rules of 
professional responsibility and by assorted informal, but important, norms of 
the legal profession to fulfill numerous duties of generosity and friendship to 
their clients as part of the pursuit of justice.  Take, for example, the oath that 
an attorney is required by state law to take before being admitted to practice.  I 
quote Indiana’s rule, by way of illustration, which prescribes the following 
oath: 
 I do solemnly swear or affirm that: I will support the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of Indiana; . . . I will not counsel 
or maintain any action, proceeding, or defense which shall appear to me to be 
unjust, but this obligation shall not prevent me from defending a person 
charged with crime in any case; I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the 
causes confided to me, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never 
seek to mislead the court or jury by artifice or false statement of fact or law; I 
will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client at 
every peril to myself; I will abstain from offensive personality and advance no 
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required 
by the justice of the cause with which I am charged; . . . I will never reject, from 
any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless, the oppressed 
. . . ; so help me God.
233
 
 The attorney oath that I have just quoted expects a lawyer to pursue justice 
for her clients but, in the process, to implicitly manifest deep generosity and 
friendship by abstaining from—and therefore counseling against—frivolous, 
vitriolic, vindictive, or malicious legal actions.  Moreover, consider some other 
examples of intertwined attorney duties of generosity and friendship toward 
clients in the pursuit of justice: (1) the professional rule that “[a] lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client,”234 and 
(2) the professional rule that “[a] lawyer shall keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with 
                                                                                                                           
231. Sara Krakoff, Does “Law and Literature” Survive Lawyerland?, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1742, 1743 (2001). 
232. Luban, supra note 230.   
233. IND. ADMISSION TO THE BAR & THE DISCIPLINE OF ATT’YS R. 22 (2004). 
234. See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2004). 
144 Widener Law Review [Vol.  15:93 
 
reasonable requests for information,”235 while “explain[ing] a matter to the 
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.”236 
 A friend would not be a slacker in getting back to someone on an important 
matter (like a dinner invitation, a request for a ride, or a plea for a 
miscellaneous favor), and a friend would not fail to keep in touch with 
another.  In a similar vein, the lawyer is admonished to be a friend of the 
client, as well as, a friend of the court.  And, as a final example of court rules 
which expect attorneys to be generous friends in the pursuit of particularized 
justice for clients, consider the “advisor” rule of professional responsibility 
which provides as follows: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, 
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”237  
Indeed, a generous friend would provide broad, wide-ranging advice to 
another about a personal problem.  A lawyer is expected to do no less.  
Besides legal, economic, social, and political factors relevant to a client’s 
problem, a lawyer is explicitly encouraged by this rule of professional conduct 
to plumb the depths of morality in advising a client.  The official commentary 
to the advisory rule of professional conduct reads like a short essay on how to 
be a good friend:238 
A client [and a friend are] entitled to straightforward advice expressing the 
lawyer’s [and friend’s] honest assessment[s].  Legal advice often involves 
unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront.  In 
presenting advice, a lawyer [and a friend] endeavors to sustain the client’s morale 
and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits.  However, a 
lawyer [and, on occasion, a friend] should not be deterred from giving candid 
advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
239
 
 Finally, every lawyer and law student hoping to apply the virtue of justice to 
their professional lives should take the time to absorb the lessons on lawyerly 
friendship offered by San Francisco attorney James J. Brosnahan.  According 
to Brosnahan, some of the greatest lawyers in Anglo-American history have 
also been wonderful friends to their clients and their fellow lawyers.240 
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9.  Discipline 
 Stephen R. Covey—the twenty-first century organizational consultant and 
motivation guru—emphasized the centrality of the virtue of discipline in his 
classic book, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. These seven disciplined 
pathways—(1) “[b]e [p]roactive,” (2) “[b]egin with the [e]nd in [m]ind,” (3) 
“[p]ut [f]irst [t]hings [f]irst,” (4) “[t]hink [w]in/[w]in,” (5) “[s]eek [f]irst to 
[u]nderstand, [t]hen to [b]e [u]nderstood,” (6) “[s]ynergize,” and (7) “[s]harpen 
the [s]aw”241—were the foundation for Covey’s eighth discipline: “[find] [y]our 
[v]oice and [inspire] [o]thers to [f]ind [t]heirs,” discussed in his recent book The 
8th Habit.242  As he explains, “[d]iscipline is paying the price to bring . . . vision 
into reality.  It’s dealing with the hard, pragmatic, brutal facts of reality and 
doing what it takes to make things happen.”243  Moreover, according to Covey, 
“[d]iscipline arises when vision joins with commitment.  The opposite of 
discipline and the commitment that inspires sacrifice is indulgence—sacrificing 
what matters most in life for the pleasure or thrill of the moment.”244  Covey 
illustrates his conception of a disciplined individual with thumbnail 
biographical sketches of George Washington, Florence Nightingale, Mohandas 
K. Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, Nelson Mandela, and Mother Teresa.245 
 The book and film, The Legend of Bagger Vance,246 speaks to the virtue of 
discipline.  Just as a golfer (depicted in the narrative) must seek his “authentic 
swing” by the hard work of practice of the right technique and attention to 
craft, so an effective individual in any of life’s pursuits will try to find his or 
her authenticity through doing what is difficult and unpleasant, but which 
becomes second nature with time. 
 The American poet, Gary Snyder, implicitly suggests a partially-western, 
partially-eastern definition of discipline as part of what it means to pursue a 
learned craft when he talks of what is required for an “apprentice.”  For an 
aspiring Japanese potter, for example, “the thing that the apprentice first learns 
how to do is mix clay.  Or Japanese carpentry apprentices who will spend 
months learning how to sharpen chisels and planes before they ever touch the 
tools to do work.”247  According to master poet Snyder, this craft learning is 
structural and cross-disciplinary: 
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A master is a master.  If you saw a man who was a master mechanic you’d do 
better—say you wanted to be a poet, and you saw a man that you recognized is 
a master mechanic or a great cook.  You would do better, for yourself as a poet, 
to study under that man than to study under another poet who was not a 
master, that you didn’t recognize as a master. 
 . . . . 
 Not only a true poet but a master—a real craftsman.  There are true poets 
who can’t teach because . . . they’re not grounded in details.  They don’t really 
know the materials.  A carpenter, a builder knows what Ponderosa pine can do, 
what Douglas fir can do, what Incense cedar can do and builds accordingly.  
You can build some very elegant houses without knowing that, but some of 
them aren’t going to work, ultimately.
248
 
 As Gary Snyder sees it, the true “apprentice”—unlike the showy, brassy, 
reality television version of the word—should take humble pains to master the 
details of his or her craft.  Snyder’s comments call on us to be mindful of 
details: the details of step-by-step processes for doing tasks; the details of the 
roots, branches, twigs and leaves of knowledge in a particular field; the 
detailed exertions of a daily regimen; the details of undoing old, out-dated 
ways of doing things in favor of newer, more efficient, more effective 
approaches. 
 Let us now turn to the topic of the discipline of finding a higher calling in 
the law.  United States Magistrate Judge Carl Horn III, in this regard, has 
written a sensitive and perspicacious book which, in my judgment, is really an 
extended meditation on the lawyerly virtue of discipline.249  Judge Horn starts 
his book by examining the cold, hard light of reality: lawyers have been 
disdained throughout American history and are vehemently disliked in the 
current era.250  His initial admonition is one of gentle, but serious, reproach: 
 What we do with this criticism, from the ancient to the most recent . . .  
may be less important than that we show good faith—and a measure of 
humility—in acknowledging it.  In the eyes of many, the legal profession has 
lost its way.  Have we?  What are our higher, more-noble purposes in twenty-
first-century America, and how might we better demonstrate these to a cynical 
public, which increasingly sees lawyers as “sharks” preying on the problems of 
others, or worse, as high-priced whores willing to do almost anything if the 
money is right? 
 These are unavoidable questions if we are to achieve what must be our 
goals: renewed ideals, a sense of “calling” in our work, and proud participation 
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in a profession that has reclaimed—even in the eyes of the fickle public—its 
“dignity and honor.”
251 
 Horn’s second reflection on the need for discipline by lawyers addresses the 
truth that, despite nostalgia for a “golden age” when American lawyers were 
cast in a heroic light, there has never been a time when lawyers were angelic or 
perceived as saints.252  Third, Horn details the professional need for attorneys 
to inculcate a middle path in their practice of law.  This Aristotelian “golden 
mean” requires steering between the “complexity of contemporary value 
judgments,”253 which may create “complete cynicism and unabashed moral 
relativism,”254 and the unrealistic notion that there are always clear-cut, black 
and white answers to difficult legal problems.255  Fourth, the wisdom reflected 
in the pages of LawyerLife counsels lawyers to realize that making positive, 
purposeful changes in their own lives as attorneys and as human beings, while 
helping to move the legal profession closer to the mountain of “higher ideals,” 
will not be achieved overnight.256  Instead, Judge Horn correctly informs us 
that these tasks “will require decades of arduous effort” and work.257  A fifth 
rumination on discipline to seek a higher calling in life and law made by Horn 
is the counterintuitive thought that lawyers and law students need to “slow 
down and smell the flowers.”258  Illustrating this point with a real-life example, 
LawyerLife describes the experience of Texas lawyer John McShane: 
 As John McShane and others tell it, his transformation from the brink of 
personal and professional disaster to a successful, balanced life and law practice 
is equal parts emotional, intellectual, and spiritual.  Today he disciplines himself 
daily to [practice] . . . la dolce far siente, which translates [as] the sweet doing of 
nothing.  He has developed a holistic or healing approach to law and life, which 
encompasses everything from snuggling with his grandson to spending late 
nights [counseling a divorce client].
259
 
 Sixth, Judge Horn provides an exemplar of the disciplined life of the law by 
noting the story of an attorney from Memphis, Tennessee, John McQuiston 
II, who incorporated the systematic classic religious text, The Rule of St. Benedict, 
into his daily life and even went so far as to rewrite the Rule for his personal 
use.260  Indeed, one of the many benefits of taking one’s chosen religion 
seriously is the restraint and focus that flow from the pursuit of a great 
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spiritual tradition.  Horn’s seventh point about discipline for lawyers is his 
account of the philosophical approach of Arnie Herz.  Herz had “traveled to 
Europe and spent two years in India studying yoga and meditation before he 
attended law school,” becoming “one of New York’s most gifted mediators 
before he turned 40.”261  The essence of attorney-mediator Herz’s success 
appears to be helping his clients to “calmly consider what is really in their best 
interest.”262  This approach, of course, requires rigorous and difficult thought 
and soul-searching that, if successful, culminates in big-picture life purposes 
being realized.263  
 For another view of the meaning of the virtue of lawyerly discipline, 
consider an article written by Professor Angela Olivia Burton.264  For Burton, 
it is vital to develop the discipline to “think like a lawyer” in order for a 
professional to “exercise . . . judgment in legal decision-making and problem-
solving” inherent in the practice of law.265  As she explains, for a law student 
to grow into a lawyer who exercises admirable professional judgment, he or 
she must bring “discipline to the process of developing intellectual 
capacities”266 requisite for effective lawyering.  Good lawyer judgment, in turn, 
is “marked by a number of particularly salient characteristics”267 which can be 
reduced to the following: 
(1) attention to a wide range of contextual information along legal, personal, 
social, and structural dimensions; (2) respect for and conscientious consideration 
of the perspectives of a variety of relevant persons and entities in addition to 
those of the client; (3) the ability to alternate between empathy and impartiality 
with respect to the client’s desires; (4) appreciation of and commitment to moral 
values such as fairness, equity, and justice; (5) critical and imaginative action-
oriented thinking; and (6) the ability to learn from experience.
268
 
 Professor Joshua D. Rosenberg—in yet another take on the meaning of 
lawyerly discipline—contends that lawyers need to improve their 
“interpersonal dynamics.”269  Rosenberg observes in this regard: 
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 Most people in this country do not like lawyers.  Most lawyers in this 
country do not like their jobs.  As a law professor, I spend most of my waking 
hours helping to turn good, likeable people into those disliked and unhappy 
lawyers.  As a result, I have felt some responsibility to at least consider both 
how the legal academy may be contributing to all of this disliking, and what we 
can do to change it. . . .  
 While most law professors, as most lawyers, seem to relish disagreeing 
with almost everything, we at least approach consensus on one common goal.  
We all strive to teach students to “think like a lawyer”: to accurately ascertain 
the relevant facts, and to apply disciplined logic and reason to those facts in 
order to arrive at a solution to whatever problem it is they are addressing.  These 
skills are essential.  Unfortunately, however, we do not teach people [the discipline of] how to 
use these skills in the contexts where they are most needed — in interactions and relationships 
with colleagues, opposing counsel, clients and decision-makers.
270
 
 Clinical law professors Cynthia Batt and Harriet N. Katz suggest three 
discipline-driven qualities that constitute lawyerly professionalism.271  First, 
lawyers and novice lawyers need to be “conscientious about the quality of 
[their] work.”272  The authors contend that essential characteristics of a 
conscientious lawyer include the following: 
• Meets deadlines, including early deadlines imposed to assure 
effective review by supervisors; 
• Makes an effort to do her best work; 
• Demonstrates an understanding of the process of work and may 
ask for assistance at any stage including defining the assignment, 
identifying resources, correcting or improving work, preparing and 
practicing for performance; 
• In group settings, recognizes the interdependence of the work 
group on each person’s contribution, accommodates the need for 
others’ input, and is respectful of the group’s mission and 
standards; 
• Keeps schedules, reports appropriately; 
• Acknowledges mistakes and asks for help to correct the error and 
its impact.
273
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 Second, Batt and Katz argue that another, over-arching, discipline-driven 
quality of attorney professionalism is “[c]uriosity [a]nd [e]mpathy.”274  
According to the professors, key attributes of a curious and empathetic lawyer 
entail the following: 
• Takes advantage of opportunities to observe lawyers and judges in 
action, alertly considering observed practices, and questioning 
participants about decisions; 
• Seeks out, hears, and responds to constructive criticism concerning 
her work; 
• Is curious about many aspects of the practice setting, seeking out 
additional information and insights, respecting and learning from 
peers and co-workers in all positions; 
• Is curious about the lives, needs, and perspectives of clients and 
others affected by the legal system, beyond the apparent presenting 
legal problem.
275
 
 Third, Batt and Katz claim a discipline-driven attorney is aware of and 
abides by “[a]ppropriate [b]ehavior [s]tandards.”276  They conclude their 
excellent article with a vital meditation about the virtue of discipline for the 
good lawyer.  They point out that reflecting on what a lawyer hopes to do and, 
then, actually does is a part of a “career-long enhancement of professionalism” 
and improvement as a practicing lawyer.277   
 In conclusion, discipline might be thought of as a kind of glue that holds 
the other lawyerly virtues together.  And yet, discipline, alone, is of little moral 
value.  Discipline is a pure instrumental virtue: it helps one achieve other, 
more substantive, virtuous ends like integrity, compassion, creativity, energy, 
and justice.  And, while some of these latter virtues are impurely 
instrumentalist in nature—for example, having compassion, creativity, and 
energy enable one to achieve virtuous ends like integrity and justice—they, 
nevertheless, have important substantive aspects as well.  Therefore, while 
discipline is a critical lawyerly virtue, I would rank it ninth on the top ten list. 
10.  Perseverance 
 A wise man once summed up the meaning of perseverance with a metaphor 
about a wood chopper: “Many strokes overthrow the tallest oaks.”278  Thus, 
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one who perseveres continues a task “steadfastly or determinedly”—persisting 
through what may come.279  Closely allied terms and phrases for perseverance 
are “keep going, stand fast or firm, . . . stop at nothing, go the distance, keep at 
it, . . . stick it out, hang on, soldier on, hang in (there); . . . endure,” and “stick 
to (it).”280  Synonyms for persistent could easily do double duty for persevere; the 
listing of these words almost makes the reader feel more determined than he 
might otherwise be inclined to be: “tenacious,” “steadfast,” “firm,” “staunch,” 
“resolved,” “unfaltering,” “unflagging,” “indefatigable,” “dogged,” 
“stubborn,” “obstinate,” “unrelenting,” “tenacity,” “stamina,” “tirelessness,” 
and “pertinacity.”281 
 The dictionary listing of related words does not do justice to the meaning of 
the human virtue of perseverance.  I remember a case that I got involved with 
early in my career as a lawyer involving a marketing company, a disgruntled 
former employee and a contractual covenant not to compete.  Happily, the 
litigation ended with an amicable settlement between the parties.  I do not 
even remember the precise facts or issues in the case.  What I do remember is 
an inspirational quotation that my client—the owner of the marketing 
company—had printed up in fancy lettering and made sure each of his sales 
representatives took on the road to help them through the hard times.  My 
client gave me a sheet of paper with that quotation as a momento of the case 
which I have had affixed to my office wall for the last twenty years.  There is 
no indication of the author or source of the wise saying (though I am still 
trying to find the author).  It states: 
Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence.  Talent will not; nothing 
is more common than unsuccessful [people] with talent.  Genius will not; the 
world is full of educated derelicts.  Persistence and determination alone are 
omnipotent. 
 M. Scott Peck, M.D.—the author of the best-selling The Road Less 
Traveled282—has also put together a wonderful “anthology of wisdom” that he 
calls Abounding Grace.283  An entire part of this book is devoted to the virtue of 
perseverance.  According to Peck’s analysis, perseverance can be broken down 
into the following “component virtues”: commitment, confidence, constancy, 
determination, devotion, diligence, endurance, patience, and perseverance.284 
 Peck synoptically refers to the virtue of perseverance as “the great virtue of 
seeing things through.”285  He observes that the “predominant theme” of 
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perseverance is “that if we persevere in ways that are not stupid or brain 
damaged, then we can achieve virtually any goal and succeed at any aim we 
desire.”286  Noting that, “we are mysteriously cocreators with God in the 
development of our souls, that God is always trying to help each of us but 
doesn’t have sole say in the matter,”287 Peck goes on to reflect on a critical 
aspect of perseverance—what he refers to in linguistic terms as “due 
diligence.”288  He writes, with self-reflective honesty: “[t]he most frequent 
reason I have failed—or witnessed others fail—in an endeavor has been a lack 
of due diligence.  We have simply failed to devote to the endeavor the amount 
of time, energy, thoughtfulness, or simple caring that the endeavor 
required.”289  Dr. Peck then cites the Latin phrase by Saint Augustine, “Dilige, 
et quod vis fac” and translates it to mean that “[i]f you are being loving, if you are 
loving God, and if you are being diligent about it all, then you can do whatever 
you want.  What you do under these circumstances will inevitably be moral 
and pleasing in the sight of God.”290 
 Scott Peck’s quotations from famous (and not-so-famous) people on the 
meaning of perseverance are enlightening.  I recommend that every lawyer and 
law student have a copy of Abounding Grace on their desktop bookshelf.  
Among the rich assortment of quotes that Peck has assembled, my personal 
favorites about perseverance are as follows: 
I am seeking, I am striving, I am in it with all my heart.  – Vincent Van Gogh
291
 
The quality of a person’s life is in direct proportion to his commitment to 
excellence, regardless of his chosen field of endeavor.  – Vince Lombardi 
292
 
I’ve always seen myself as a winner, even as a kid.  If I hadn’t, I just might have 
gone down the drain a couple of times.  I’ve got something inside of me, 
peasantlike and stubborn, and I’m in it ‘til the end of the race. – Truman 
Capote
293 
It’s so important to believe in yourself.  Believe that you can do it, under any 
circumstances.  Because if you believe you can, then you really will.  That belief 
just keeps you searching for the answers, and then pretty soon you get it.  – 
Wally “Famous” Amos
294
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Let us, then, be up and doing, With a heart for any fate; Still achieving, still 
pursuing, Learn to labor and to wait.  – Henry Wadsworth Longfellow
295
 
Never give in!  Never give in!  Never, never, never.  Never—in anything great or 
small, large or petty—never give in except to convictions of honor and good 
sense.   – Winston Churchill
296
 
Get a good idea and stay with it.  Dog it, and work at it until it’s done, and done 
right.   – Walt Disney
297
 
Diligence is the mother of good luck, and God gives all things to industry.  
Then plough deep while sluggards sleep, and you shall have corn to sell and to 
keep.   – Benjamin Franklin
298
 
The foot of the farmer is the best manure for his land.   – German Proverb
299
 
Patience can break through iron doors.   – Yugoslav Proverb
300
 
Never think that God’s delays are God’s denials.  Hold on; hold fast; hold out.  
Patience is genius.   – Comte de Buffon
301
 
The most extraordinary thing about the oyster is this.  Irritations get into his 
shell.  He does not like them.  But when he cannot get rid of them, he uses the 
irritation to do the loveliest thing an oyster ever has a chance to do.  If there are 
irritations in our lives today, there is only one prescription: make a pearl.  It may 
have to be a pearl of patience, but, anyhow, make a pearl.  And it takes faith and 
love to do it.   – Harry Emerson Fosdick
302
 
Pray to God, but keep rowing to the shore.   – Russian Proverb
303
 
I never did anything worth doing by accident, nor did any of my inventions 
come by accident; they came by work.   – Thomas Alva Edison
304
 
A bar of iron, continually ground, becomes a needle.   – Chinese Proverb
305
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When you come to the end of your rope, tie a knot and hang on.   – Franklin D. 
Roosevelt
306
 
You win some, you lose some, and some get rained out, but you gotta suit up 
for them all.   – J. Askenberg
307
  
Ev’ry day fishin’ day, but no ev’ry day catch fish.   – Bahamian Proverb
308
 
As we say in the sewer, if you’re not prepared to go all the way, don’t put your 
boots on in the first place.   – Ed Norton
309
 
 Knowledgeable legal commentators have emphasized the importance of the 
lawyerly virtue of perseverance.  In certain areas of legal practice, for example 
criminal defense work and immigration practice, being able to hang tough and 
to endure setbacks and disappointments is critical.  I think that perseverance is 
emphasized in these two practice areas because both a criminal defense 
attorney and an immigration lawyer face the unpleasant reality of opposing the 
full powers of government (with its substantial resources, personnel, powerful 
backing, and inherent prestige).  Thus, if you happen to be a criminal defense 
lawyer or an immigration attorney, you must earn your daily bread by 
hunkering down, digging in, and tirelessly fighting the Leviathan on behalf of 
your beleaguered clients.310 
 But, the virtue of perseverance is essential for lawyers in virtually every 
practice area of law.  Indeed, the virtue of perseverance has been discussed by 
authors in the context of: construction law,311 small business law,312 civil rights 
law,313 communications law,314 bankruptcy law,315 class action litigation,316 
                                                                                                                           
306. Id. at 164. 
307. ABOUNDING GRACE, supra note 283, at 165. 
308. Id. at 166. 
309. Id. at 168. 
310. See, e.g., David J. Kessler, Learning the Legal Ropes with the Death Penalty, 35 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 567, 571 (2004) (the importance of “persistence and follow-up” by a criminal defense 
attorney in a death penalty case); Jean Coleman Blackerby, Note, Life After Death Row: Preventing 
Wrongful Capital Convictions and Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1203 
(2003) (combination of scientific advances and an attorney’s unrelenting effort led to one 
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David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 817, 830 (2003) (thanks to 
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George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and 
Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 215 (2001); Sadiq Reza, Religion and the Public Defender, 
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051, 1051 (1999); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the INS: A 
Case for Civilian Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 40-41 (1994). 
311. See, e.g., Leslie O’Neale-Coble, In Memoriam: Erwin L. Corwin (1927-2004), UNDER 
CONSTR. (ABA Forum on the Constr., Chicago, IL.), Mar. 2004, at 5.  
312. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Representing Agents of Community Economic Development: A 
Comment on Recent Trends, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 261, 267 (2004). 
313. See, e.g., J. Clay Smith, Jr., Celebrating Fifty Years of Desegregation Jurisprudence: The 
Road to Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 47 HOW. L.J. 1075, 1076 (2004); Joseph 
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eminent domain law,317 international law,318 torts,319 identity-based social 
movements and public law,320 antitrust law,321 insurance law,322 Native 
American law,323 disabilities law,324 social security law,325 commercial law,326 
“political lawyering,”327 and tax law.328 
    Abraham Lincoln named perseverance as an essential virtue for aspiring 
lawyers.329  Professor Daniel Kornstein explains how lawyers like Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Wallace Stevens persevered in their study and 
practice of law by keeping in mind the big picture of the law as a form of 
literature: 
                                                                                                                           
Bellacosa, Introductory Remarks to Symposium: Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: Have We 
Achieved Its Goals?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 257, 257 (2004). 
314. See, e.g., Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the Media, Supporting the First 
Amendment: The Paradox of Neville Johnson and the Battle for Privacy, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1097, 1108 
(2004). 
315. See, e.g., Brittany E. Powell, Comment, Eliminating Fee Enhancements: Encouraging 
Quality Representation in Bankruptcy While Maximizing the Value to the Estate, 20 BANKR. DEVS. J. 
207, 232 (2003). 
316. See, e.g., Seth M. Wood, Note, The Master Settlement Agreement as Class Action: An 
Evaluative Framework for Settlements of Publicly Initiated Litigation, 89 VA. L. REV. 597, 616 (2003). 
317. See, e.g., James L. Thompson, Condemnation of Easements, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE 
OF STUDY MATERIALS, EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 375, 386 (2003). 
318. See, e.g., Michael Foster, Book Review, FED. LAW., Aug. 2002, at 53, 53-54. 
(discussing international litigation against Libya stemming from the destruction of Pan Am 
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland). 
319. See, e.g., Dan Christensen, Paving the Way for a Road Hazard Case, TRIAL, Jan. 2002, 
at 46, 47. 
320. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and 
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 466-67 (2001). 
321. See, e.g., Leonard Orland, Essay, The Microsoft End Game, 34 CONN. L. REV. 221, 
223 (2001). 
322. See, e.g., Arnold R. Levinson & Terrence J. Coleman, Insurance Bad Faith Claims 
Are Not Preempted, TRIAL, June 2001, at 30, 35. 
323. See, e.g., Ken Bellmard, Endeavoring to Persevere: Becoming and Being a Tribal Attorney, 
9 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 752 (2000). 
324. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So 
Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury?  A 
Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. OF LITIG. 505, 540-41 (2000). 
325. See, e.g., Victor Fusco, Outline of Attorney Fees in Social Security Cases, 181 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 201, 212 (1999). 
326. See, e.g., Harold A. Segall, Then and Now: The Commercial Practice of Law for Over Fifty 
Years, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 590 (1997). 
327. See, e.g., Peter M. Cicchino, To Be a Political Lawyer, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
311, 313 (1996). 
328. See, e.g., James W. Buchanan III, Valuation and Taxation of Transfers of Oil and Gas 
Interests to Charities, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561 (1987). 
329. See Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Legal Profession, 68 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 85, 106 n.92 (1994) (referring to a list of lawyerly qualities Lincoln considered 
essential including: “diligence, perseverance, preparedness, poise, peaceableness, morality, 
honesty and monetary fairness in one’s work”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
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 “When I began,” Holmes once wrote, “the law presented itself as a rag 
bag of details,” and “a thick fog of details.”  He went on: “It was not without 
anguish that one asked oneself whether the subject was worthy of the interest of 
an intelligent mind.”  Elsewhere: “One saw people who one respected and 
admired leaving the study because they thought it narrowed the mind.”  The 
study of law struck Holmes at the start as finding oneself plunged in “a black 
and frozen night, in which there were no flowers, no spring, no easy joys.” 
 It was against this background and experience that Holmes later spoke of 
art and the law.  Holmes here reminds us of how our other law-trained artists 
reacted to law school. . . . And yet, Holmes persevered.  He finished his legal 
studies, graduated, became a lawyer and practiced for fifteen years before being 
appointed to the faculty at Harvard Law School.  Holmes was able to do so 
without breaking down psychologically because in a way he, like Wallace 
Stevens, never abandoned literature.
330
 
 Richard Peña, a Texas lawyer, encapsulated the importance of lawyerly 
perseverance by using Atticus Finch—the lawyer made famous by Gregory 
Peck in the movie, “To Kill a Mockingbird”—as a touchstone.  According to 
Peña: “Take this example [of perseverance and integrity] to heart and, when 
faced with a [legal] problem, ask yourself this very simple question, ‘What 
would Atticus do?’”331  Perhaps Atticus Finch’s perseverance is what Judge 
Marvin E. Aspen had in mind when he wrote: “An attorney who consistently 
refuses to fight back [on a petty, personal level] and perseveres in maintaining 
a civil demeanor may eventually convince opposing counsel that his or her 
petty behavior is succeeding only in prolonging the case and increasing costs 
for everyone.”332 
 Both Revolutionary Era lawyers John Adams and John Marshall became 
known for their perseverance in learning to practice law.333  Early nineteenth 
century lawyer, Supreme Court advocate, and United States Attorney General, 
William Wirt, emphasized perseverance as a key attribute of a good lawyer: 
In his letters of advice to those whom he was desirous of assisting, he 
continually enlarged upon the importance of laborious effort, affirming that, in 
his opinion, the “paucity of great men, in all ages, has proceeded from the 
universality of indolence,” and that, “glory is not that easy kind of inheritance 
                                                                                                                           
330. Daniel J. Kornstein, The Double Life of Wallace Stevens: Is Law Ever the “Necessary 
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331. Richard Peña, What Would Atticus Do?, 62 TEX. B.J. 14, 14 (1999). 
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which the law will cast upon you, without any effort of your own; but — you are 
to work for it, and fight for it, with the patient perseverance of a Hercules. ”
334
 
 Daniel H. Burnham, an early twentieth century architect who designed the 
1892-93 Chicago Columbian Exhibition335 and authored a 1908 plan of 
development for the City of Chicago, talked about “Chicago spirit” as a 
constant, steady determination to bring about the very best conditions of city 
life for all people.336  Indeed, lawyers need to nurture their own “spirit” of 
constant, steady determination”—called perseverance—to seek justice for their 
clients and to be willing to do the hard, hard work entailed in that enterprise. 
 Perseverance, then, is an essential virtue of the good lawyer.337 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 American lawyers practicing their profession in the twenty-first century face 
an array of challenges: from the intensifying competitive environment to the 
increasing expectations of clients; from the proliferation of new laws and 
relevant legal systems in the milieu of expanding globalization to the pressure 
of keeping abreast of rapidly changing economic conditions. 
 On the one hand, it is time for lawyers to reinvigorate the ancient 
philosophical pursuit of Aristotle and Plato in searching for the meaning of 
virtue and vice.  On the other hand, this ancient tradition needs to be 
reexamined, reshaped, and resuscitated with an eye toward what is 
pragmatic—what will yield the greatest net payoff in coping with a volatile 
profession in a mercurial world. 
 Some may object to the idea of a pragmatically virtuous lawyer because it is 
ambiguous or, at its worst, “implies the opposite of virtue—the willingness to 
do whatever needs to be done (ethics aside) to get something done.”338  Yet, at 
is best, to be pragmatically virtuous is akin to “prudence or practical 
wisdom.”339  While I might have titled this article the “Prudent Lawyer” or the 
“Practically Wise Lawyer,” I find the word “pragmatically” to be more apt 
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because to be pragmatic challenges twenty-first century American lawyers to 
try to “[see] things clearly and fully as they are,” in Monroe Freedman’s340 turn 
of phrase.  In other words, I think that traditional virtue ethics is too far 
removed from the real world and needs a more nitty-gritty, here-and-now 
focus.  To be pragmatically virtuous as an American lawyer, then, means trying 
to figure out how to be a good and effective attorney in an environment that is 
full of temptation, evil, and ambiguity. 
 This article suggests that a pragmatic approach to lawyerly virtue at this 
uncertain time is for lawyers to pursue ten key virtues.  First: balance.  Second: 
integrity.  Third: idealism.  Fourth: compassion.  Fifth: courage.  Sixth: creativity.  
Seventh: energy.  Eighth: justice.  Ninth: discipline.  And tenth: perseverance. 
 The pursuit of these ten lawyerly virtues is an art.  The art requires 
judgment and discretion in combining the virtues in concrete, real-life 
situations.  In the final analysis, the pragmatically virtuous lawyer is one who is 
constantly applying abstract concepts of the good to specific, fact-intensive 
problems. 
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